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ARTICLES 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSPEECH 
Josh Chafetz* 
 
Political theater.  Spectacle.  Circus.  Reality show.  We are constantly 
told that, whatever good congressional oversight is, it certainly is not those 
things.  Observers and participants across the ideological and partisan 
spectrums use those descriptions as pejorative attempts to delegitimize 
oversight conducted by their political opponents or as cautions to their own 
allies of what is to be avoided.  Real oversight, on this consensus view, is 
about fact-finding, not about performing for an audience.  As a result, when 
oversight is done right, it is both civil and consensus-building. 
While plenty of oversight activity does indeed involve bipartisan attempts 
to collect information and use that information to craft policy, this Article 
seeks to excavate and theorize a different way of using oversight tools, a way 
that focuses primarily on their use as a mechanism of public communication.  
I refer to such uses as congressional overspeech. 
After briefly describing the authority, tools and methods, and consensus 
understanding of oversight in Part I, this Article turns to an analysis of 
overspeech in Part II.  The three central features of overspeech are its 
communicativity, its performativity, and its divisiveness, and each of these 
is analyzed in some detail.  Finally, Part III offers two detailed case studies 
of overspeech:  the Senate Munitions Inquiry of the mid-1930s and the 
McCarthy and Army-McCarthy Hearings of the early 1950s.  These case 
studies not only demonstrate the dynamics of overspeech in action but also 
illustrate that overspeech is both continuous across and adaptive to different 
media environments.  Moreover, the case studies illustrate that overspeech 
can be used in the service of normatively good, normatively bad, and 
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normatively ambivalent political projects.  Overspeech is a potent 
congressional tool—and, like all tools, it can be put to a variety of uses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the swirl of investigations leading up to the impeachment of President 
Donald Trump, Democrats and Republicans didn’t find much common 
ground.  But one place they did seem to come together was in their 
conceptions of what good congressional investigations look like.  In seeking 
to delegitimize the use of congressional oversight tools, the White House and 
its allies repeatedly insisted that, rather than engaging in nonpartisan fact-
finding, the investigations were instead partisan performances aimed at a 
public audience.  Strikingly, administration opponents largely agreed with 
the administration’s underlying premise that public-facing, performative, and 
partisan uses of oversight tools are improper or degraded—the opponents 
simply limited themselves to either denying that this was what they were in 
fact doing or warning their allies against doing so. 
Consider the controversy surrounding Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s 
congressional testimony in July 2019.  Mueller initially resisted testifying, 
announcing at a press conference that, “[a]ny testimony from this office 
would not go beyond our report . . . .  We chose those words carefully, and 
the work speaks for itself.  And the report is my testimony.”1  Democrats 
 
 1. Letting the Report ‘Speak for Itself,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2019, at A16; see also 
Rachel Bade & Karoun Demirjian, Mueller’s Statement Increases Pressure on Pelosi to Begin 
Trump Impeachment, WASH. POST (May 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/muellers-statement-increases-pressure-on-pelosi-to-begin-trump-impeachment/ 
2019/05/29/60e8ec5c-8228-11e9-933d-7501070ee669_story.html [https://perma.cc/D3KS-
L5RF] (“Privately, Mueller has been expressing reluctance to testify in public.  On 
Wednesday, that sentiment was evident as he said that he would not answer questions beyond 
what he wrote in his report.”). 
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found Mueller’s reticence less than compelling,2 eventually issuing a 
subpoena for his testimony.3  Republicans were not pleased.  President 
Trump immediately tweeted that the subpoenas constituted “Presidential 
Harassment!”4  Attorney General William Barr insisted that, because 
Mueller’s testimony was unlikely to bring new facts to light, the subpoenas 
did not “serve[] an important purpose”—rather, their sole purpose was to 
“create some kind of public spectacle.”5  And Barr was not the only 
Republican to reach for the metaphor of public entertainment:  Michael 
Conaway (R-TX), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, remarked 
that, “I can’t imagine there’s much to glean from him beyond what’s in the 
report . . . .  I think it’s just theater.”6  In his opening statement at the hearing 
at which Mueller testified, Intelligence Committee ranking member Devin 
Nunes (R-CA), too, referred to the proceedings derisively as “political 
theater,”7 as did several other Republican members.8  Conservative media 
 
 2. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, House Democrats Push for More from a Reluctant 
Witness, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2019, at A17 (reporting Intelligence Committee Chair Adam 
Schiff’s comment that “there are . . . a great many questions [Mueller] can answer that go 
beyond the report”); Id. (quoting other Democrats to similar effect); Sharon LaFraniere, 
Breaking Silence, Mueller Declines to Absolve Trump, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2019, at A1 
(reporting Majority Leader Steny Hoyer’s comment that “the American people deserve to hear 
testimony from the special counsel about his report and the report’s conclusions”); Bade & 
Demirjian, supra note 1 (reporting Chief Deputy Whip Dan Kildee’s comment that Mueller 
“has an obligation to explain in as much detail as Congress wants the process of this 
investigation and the conclusions that he drew”). 
 3. See Letter from Reps. Jerrold Nadler & Adam Schiff to Robert S. Mueller, III, Special 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (June 25, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/Letter%20to%20Special%20Counsel%20Mu
eller%20%286.25.19%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B7C-F93B] (“Attached please find 
subpoenas from the House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence to compel your testimony . . . .  Over the course of discussions about your 
appearance before Congress, we have consistently communicated our Committees’ intention 
to issue these subpoenas, if necessary, and we now understand it is necessary to do so.”). 
 4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 25, 2019, 10:34 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1143709133234954241 [https://perma.cc/ 
MM2U-QT7N]. 
 5. David Shortell, Barr Says Mueller Subpoena Done to Create ‘Public Spectacle,’ CNN 
(July 8, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/08/politics/william-barr-robert-
mueller-testimony-spectacle/index.html [https://perma.cc/2E52-SGBM]. 
 6. Chris Megerian & Jennifer Haberkorn, Eager to Hear Their Version of the Truth; 
Democrats Want to See Trump Declared Guilty; the GOP Wants Him Cleared.  Mueller May 
Do Neither, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2019, at A1, ProQuest Doc. No. 2262592036. 
 7. WATCH:  Nunes Calls Mueller Hearing ‘Political Theater,’ PBS NEWS HOUR (July 
24, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-nunes-calls-mueller-
hearing-political-theater [https://perma.cc/3P29-MQZH]. 
 8. See Rachael Bade et al., Mueller to Testify to Congress in Open Session About His 
Investigation, WASH. POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
mueller-to-testify-to-congress-in-open-session-about-his-investigation/2019/06/25/dde8c95a 
-975b-11e9-916d-9c61607d8190_story.html [https://perma.cc/BG35-4R5R] (reporting 
Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC)’s comment, “I just think it’s more political theater”); 
Sarah Gager, Representative Reed Calls Mueller Hearings “Political Theater,” WSKG (July 
24, 2019), https://wskg.org/news/rep-reed-calls-mueller-testimony-political-theater/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z7S8-6J2R] (reporting Representative Tom Reed (R-NY)’s statement to reporters); 
see also Ronna McDaniel, Opinion, RNC Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel:  Dems Stage 
Political Theater with Mueller Instead of Serving American People, FOX NEWS (July 24, 
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got in on the showbiz metaphors, as well.  The day of Mueller’s testimony, 
the Wall Street Journal editorialized that, “[t]here’s nothing like a celebrity 
guest to boost a flagging TV show, and House Democrats are hoping Robert 
Mueller’s congressional performance this week revives their impeachment 
ratings.  Yet if the former special counsel stays true to his own investigation 
and report, this episode will be the last.”9  A conservative columnist for the 
New York Post described Mueller’s forthcoming testimony thus:  “The circus 
is coming to town and the carnival barkers are working up a sweat trying to 
spark interest.  So far, ticket sales are slow.”10  In the aftermath of Mueller’s 
testimony, the Wall Street Journal declared that “The Mueller Show is a 
Bust.”11  And Trump-skeptical conservative Kevin Williamson managed, in 
the space of a single column (of fewer than 800 words) appraising the 
aftermath of the hearings, to use “circus,” “reality-show,” “goat rodeo,” 
“putting on a show,” “theater,” and “spectacle.”12 
But Republicans weren’t the only ones to use the language of public 
performance in a derogatory manner with respect to Mueller’s testimony.  
Before Mueller testified, former Democratic Representative Timothy 
Roemer (D-IN) wrote to warn against the hearings becoming “a wild circus 
show.”13  Slate commentator Dahlia Lithwick thought it would inevitably be 
degradedly performative:  “It will be like a cover of k. d. lang’s cover of 
Rufus Wainwright’s cover of Leonard Cohen’s Hallelujah, except actually it 
will be Mueller doing a cover of himself, in the hopes that people will tune 
in to the live made-for-TV version.”14  A distinguished left-leaning scholar 
of law and politics thought the hearings held more potential, tweeting that 
House “Democrats questioning Mueller should avoid theatrics and 
grandstanding and let staff walk Mueller through [his] report 
conclusions . . . .  Should be a moment for seriousness.”15  And in the 
 
2019), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/rnc-chairwoman-ronna-mcdaniel-dems-stage-
political-theater-with-mueller-instead-of-serving-american-people [https://perma.cc/2L3A-
NJQT] (the RNC chairwoman using the same metaphor). 
 9. Editorial, Robert Mueller’s Summer Re-run, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2019, at A16. 
 10. Michael Goodwin, Opinion, Dems Take Desperate Final Shot at Trump with Mueller 
Testimony, N.Y. POST (July 20, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/07/20/dems-take-desperate-
final-shot-at-trump-with-mueller-testimony/ [https://perma.cc/BCJ7-6RB9]. 
 11. Editorial, The Mueller Show Is a Bust, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2019, at A14. 
 12. Kevin D. Williamson, The Mueller Hearings Revealed Why You Shouldn’t Bet Against 
Trump, NAT’L REV. (July 25, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/ 
the-mueller-hearings-revealed-why-you-shouldnt-bet-against-trump/ [https://perma.cc/89UC 
-DK4L]. 
 13. Timothy Roemer, Opinion, Lawmakers Should Not Turn the Mueller Testimony into 
a Circus, HILL (July 22, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/454153-
lawmakers-should-not-turn-the-mueller-testimony-into-a-circus [https://perma.cc/2DN9-
EXHD]. 
 14. Dahlia Lithwick, Robert Mueller’s Testimony Before House Democrats Is a Game of 
Chicken Between Chickens, SLATE (July 23, 2019, 8:07 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/07/robert-mueller-testimony-house-democrat-chickens.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K2BD-264R]. 
 15. Rick Hasen (@rickhasen), TWITTER (July 6, 2019, 6:53 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
rickhasen/status/1147639630700769280 [https://perma.cc/YL7L-4UHA]. 
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aftermath of the hearings, Lithwick’s Slate colleague Jeremy Stahl 
characterized them as “banal political theater that revealed no new facts.”16 
Nor did the disparaging use of the language of performativity end with 
Mueller’s testimony.  When it later came to light that Trump had threatened 
to withhold appropriated military aid from Ukraine unless its government 
opened an investigation into alleged corruption involving the son of former 
Vice President Joe Biden—a Democrat then vying for his party’s nomination 
to run against Trump in 2020—House Democrats opened a new round of 
investigations.  These included closed and open hearings before the 
Intelligence Committee,17 hearings before the Judiciary Committee,18 and 
finally the adoption of articles of impeachment.19 
From the moment that the Ukraine revelations became public, Democrats 
supporting impeachment insisted that their party not succumb to the 
temptations of theatricality.  Joe Lockhart, who had served as press secretary 
to President Bill Clinton, argued that the questioning in impeachment 
hearings should be primarily conducted by counsel, not by members, and that 
“[t]he investigators’ guiding principle should be just the facts, not the 
theater.”20  In announcing her support for impeachment, Representative Tulsi 
Gabbard (D-HI) (a long-shot contender for the Democratic presidential 
nomination at the time) insisted that the process “cannot be turned into a long, 
protracted partisan circus.”21  Like Lockhart, liberal commentator Margaret 
Carlson argued that Democrats should turn over questioning to counsel, who 
could act as “grown-up finders of fact . . . .  The best thing that could happen 
is that the hearings are so tediously legal, only C-Span covers them.”22 
The Intelligence Committee began by holding closed hearings in a 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) to allow for the taking 
of classified testimony.  At one point in the hearings, Republican House 
members who were not on the Intelligence Committee gathered outside the 
 
 16. Jeremy Stahl, Top CBP Officer Testifies He’s Unsure If 3-Year-Old Is “a Criminal or 
a National Security Threat,” SLATE (July 26, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/07/cbp-chief-brian-hastings-family-separation-judiciary-hearing-not-
mueller.html [https://perma.cc/W8RR-374L]. 
 17. See Nicholas Fandos, An Inquiry Is out of Public View, but That’s Not out of the 
Ordinary, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2019, at A18 (closed hearings); Nicholas Fandos & Michael 
D. Shear, Envoys Reveal Scope of Trump Ukraine Push, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2019, at A1 
(open hearings). 
 18. See Adam Liptak, A Divide Over Whether the Evidence Is There, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2019, at A20. 
 19. H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (as agreed to in House of Representatives, Dec. 
18, 2019). 
 20. Joe Lockhart, Opinion, Why I Was Wrong to Oppose Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/opinion/impeachment-whistleblower-
complaint.html [https://perma.cc/93ZS-WL8M]. 
 21. Maggie Astor, Tulsi Gabbard, Last 2020 Holdout, Supports Impeachment Inquiry, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/us/politics/tulsi-gabbard-
impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/SZR3-SW3Q]. 
 22. Margaret Carlson, Do You Want to Preen on Camera, Democrats, or Do You Want to 
Take Down Trump?, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
do-you-want-to-preen-on-camera-democrats-or-do-you-want-to-take-down-trump [https:// 
perma.cc/AA75-MKXF]. 
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SCIF loudly demanding access, and some of them barged into the room.  
Ultimately, the House sergeant at arms was called to restore order.23  
Democrats and liberal commentators referred to the “storming of the 
SCIF”—which garnered significant media attention—as a “stunt,” “circus-
like,”24 and “guerrilla street theater.”25 
After the closed-door hearings wrapped up, the Intelligence Committee 
moved into two weeks of public hearings.  Republican Representative Louie 
Gohmert (R-TX) predicted that the hearings would be “a sham circus.”26  
Trump’s former attorney general Jeff Sessions called the hearings a Soviet-
style “show trial” and “political theater.”27  On the other side of the aisle, 
Democratic Representative David Cicilline (D-RI) urged his colleagues to 
eschew such descriptions:  “This is not a circus, it is a solemn moment.”28  
Commentators on both sides threw around accusations of theatricality as 
well.  Liberal Caroline Frederickson accused Republicans of trying to turn 
the hearings into “just another version of reality TV,”29 while conservative 
Kyle Smith referred to the hearings as “MasterTroll Theater.  The Democrats 
know they’re engaged in a futile exercise that exists only to draw attention.”30 
After the Intelligence Committee hearings ended, impeachment moved to 
the Judiciary Committee, which the New York Times’s television critic 
referred to as a move “from foreign-intrigue thriller to constitutional 
documentary,” with four law professors testifying on the constitutional 
standards and processes of impeachment.31  Ultimately, the Judiciary 
Committee reported out two articles of impeachment:  one asserting that 
Trump abused his power in pressuring Ukraine to investigate Biden and the 
other asserting that he had obstructed the congressional investigation into his 
 
 23. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, Turmoil as G.O.P. Disrupts Inquiry on 
Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2019, at A1. 
 24. Robert P. Baird, The Circus Comes to the House Impeachment Inquiry, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-circus-comes-to-the-house-
impeachment-inquiry [https://perma.cc/MT2E-NAF9]. 
 25. Ed Kilgore, Republicans Storm Closed Meeting, Demanding Transparency for Their 
Stonewalling POTUS, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 23, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/ 
10/republicans-bust-into-closed-meeting-to-protest-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F4SX-ADTQ]. 
 26. Mark Leibovich, A Return of Old Washington in Defiance of a Raucous Era, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2019, at A1. 
 27. Jeff Sessions, Opinion, Ex-AG Jeff Sessions:  Trump Impeachment Hearings Are 
Desperate Democratic Attack on Him—No Reason to Impeach, FOX NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/jeff-sessions-on-impeachment [https://perma.cc/N5XL-
3XS2]. 
 28. Leibovich, supra note 26. 
 29. Caroline Frederickson, Opinion, Republicans Want to Turn the Impeachment 
Hearings into ‘Judge Judy,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/ 
14/opinion/trump-impeachment-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/CE82-E2RN]. 
 30. Kyle Smith, Impeachment Theater of Trolls, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:23 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/impeachment-hearings-day-one-voters-
uninterested/ [https://perma.cc/WYA2-XJMX]. 
 31. James Poniewozik, Shifting from Drama to a Documentary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2019, 
at A23. 
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wrongdoing.32  Trump’s 2020 campaign manager responded that “Democrats 
are putting on this political theater because they don’t have a viable candidate 
for 2020 and they know it.”33  On a near-party-line vote, the House 
impeached President Trump on December 18, 2019.34 
When it came time for the Senate trial, many Republicans were dismissive 
of the House’s process.  Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV) described it 
as “nothing but political theater”;35 Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) described it 
as a “charade”;36 and Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) referred to it as a 
“circus.”37  Conservative commentators referred to the process as “a political 
puppet show”38 and “‘Resistance’ theatrics.”39  After it became clear that the 
Senate would not hear new testimony, it became Democrats’ turn to reach 
for the pejorative language of performativity.  Commentators called the 
Senate trial a “show trial”40 and a “sham.”41  On February 5, 2020, Trump 
was acquitted on near-party-line votes.42 
These descriptions throughout the impeachment saga from participants 
and observers both left and right reveal some widely (albeit certainly not 
universally) shared assumptions about what it means to do congressional 
oversight properly.  Most prominently, they convey an almost overwhelming 
sense of anti-theatricality:43  whatever good oversight is, it isn’t a 
“spectacle,” a “circus,” or “political theater.”  Lying behind that palpable 
 
 32. H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (as agreed to in House of Representatives, Dec. 
18, 2019). 
 33. Rebecca Klar, Trump Campaign:  Democrats Pursuing Impeachment Because They 
Don’t Have ‘Viable’ 2020 Candidate, HILL (Dec. 10, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://thehill.com/ 
homenews/campaign/473829-trump-campaign-democrats-impeaching-trump-because-they-
dont-have-viable [https://perma.cc/2ADR-B5XD]. 
 34. Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Trump Impeached, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2019, 
at A1. 
 35. Lauren Leatherby et al., What Senators Have Said About Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/us/politics/senators-
impeachment-reactions.html [https://perma.cc/V9U2-G6RF]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Matthew Daly, Dispute Over Rules Erupts on Impeachment’s First Full Day, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/32e6ac935103430dd8ccb7ba6 
a088334 [https://perma.cc/U2BK-LYZZ]. 
 38. John Kass, Dems Desperate to Protect Their Source of Power, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 
2020, at 2, ProQuest Doc. No. 2342988978. 
 39. Guy Benson, Analysis:  With Insults and Hyperbole, Schiff and Nadler Choose 
Resistance Theater over Persuasion, TOWNHALL (Jan. 27, 2020, 10:05 AM), https:// 
townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2020/01/27/analysis-by-insulting-jurors-schiff-and-nadler-
prioritize-resistance-theater-over-persuasion-n2560139 [https://perma.cc/XQ9P-Y5PC]. 
 40. Maureen Dowd, Opinion, Trump, Unrepentant and Unleashed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2020, at SR9; Jeremy Stahl, Begging the Questions, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2020, 9:40 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/01/no-impeachment-witnesses-mitch-mcconnell-
senate-dershowitz-bolton.html [https://perma.cc/G444-MKKN]. 
 41. Michael D. Shear & Nicholas Fandos, Senate Republicans Block Witnesses, 51 to 49, 
Clearing a Path for the President’s Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2020, at A1. 
 42. Nicholas Fandos, Split Senate Clears Trump on Each Count in Finale of Bitter 
Impeachment Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2020, at A1. 
 43. The classic text on the anti-theatrical bias remains JONAS BARISH, THE 
ANTITHEATRICAL PREJUDICE (1981).  For a more recent revisionist account, see LISA A. 
FREEMAN, ANTITHEATRICALITY AND THE BODY PUBLIC (2017). 
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sense of what good oversight isn’t is a cluster of ideas about what it is:  good 
oversight is understood to be more about listening than talking, more about 
fact-finding than perspective-proclaiming.  It is also understood to be 
bipartisan and, above all, civil.  And indeed, much important and useful 
oversight does involve bipartisan attempts to collect information and use that 
information to craft policy.44 
But that is not the only way of using the tools of congressional oversight 
effectively.  This Article proposes that some congressional oversight activity 
is better characterized as congressional overspeech.  The defining 
characteristic of overspeech is the use of oversight mechanisms to 
communicate with the broader public.  As such, it emphasizes the 
performative and divisive aspects of oversight.  Attention to congressional 
overspeech, and the ways in which it serves political goals distinct from those 
put forward by the consensus view of oversight, gives us a significantly fuller 
picture of Congress’s role in our constitutional system.  Like all tools, 
overspeech does not specify its own goals, and it can accordingly be used in 
the service of either good or bad ends.  But if one hopes to understand how 
political actors pursue their goals in the American federal system, it is a 
mistake to view overspeech as simply a degraded form of oversight—as 
“mere” political theater.  In particular, if one hopes to understand the full 
range of powers that congressional chambers and members can and do make 
use of to push back against an imperial executive, it is a mistake to overlook 
overspeech. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of congressional oversight, 
introducing both the sources of authority for oversight and the tools used in 
conducting it.  This part also discusses in more detail the consensus view of 
oversight—that is, the understanding we saw at work in the debates over 
Mueller’s testimony and the impeachment proceedings.  Part II then turns to 
an analysis of overspeech, or the use of those same tools, pursuant to those 
same sources of authority, but for ends other than those recognized by the 
consensus view.  This part identifies three main characteristics of 
overspeech:  its communicativity, its performativity, and its divisiveness.  
These are presented in increasing order of controversiality—almost no one 
wholly denies a communicative role for oversight, although the consensus 
view requires that it take a back seat to fact-finding.  But making a case for 
performativity, and especially divisiveness, as anything other than indicia of 
oversight failure or degradation is significantly more controversial.  Finally, 
Part III offers two detailed case studies of overspeech from different periods 
in American history—and therefore different media environments—in order 
to examine overspeech in action.  These case studies also partake of an array 
of normative valences.  The point is to demonstrate that congressional 
overspeech is an important mechanism of constitutional politics, not that its 
use inevitably produces good outcomes. 
 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 159–62. 
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I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Although tracing the history of legislative oversight is well beyond the 
scope of this Article, it has been a feature of our federal government since at 
least the 1792 House investigation into the defeat of an army force under the 
command of General Arthur St. Clair by a confederacy of Native American 
tribes at the Battle of the Wabash.45  Indeed, that investigation was authorized 
after the House of Representatives rejected an earlier proposal to “request[]” 
that President George Washington initiate an investigation into the defeat.46  
The resulting House investigation, conducted by a special committee, 
involved the testimony of St. Clair himself and Secretary of War Henry 
Knox, as well as an examination of St. Clair’s personal papers and papers 
from the War Department and the Treasury Department (personally delivered 
by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton).47  The committee exonerated 
St. Clair and placed much of the blame for the defeat on Knox.  The House 
then ordered the committee to reopen the investigation in order to hear further 
from Knox and others.  The committee’s second report was perhaps even 
more damning of Knox, but it did not recommend any specific action, and 
ultimately no action was taken by the entire House in direct consequence of 
the report.48  However, while the committee was deliberating, Congress 
passed a law taking authority for procuring army supplies away from the 
secretary of war and locating it in the Treasury Department,49 an act 
characterized by historian George Chalou as “a slap at Knox.”50  The 
investigation as a whole also “embarrassed and politically damaged the 
Federalists” and emboldened the Jeffersonian faction in nascent partisan 
competition.51 
In conducting the St. Clair hearings, the House was calling on a long 
history of legislative oversight in the Anglo-American tradition.  By the mid-
sixteenth century, the House of Commons was impaneling committees and 
taking evidence for the purpose of determining contested elections (a 
function it had wrested from the Crown).52  In the seventeenth century, this 
investigatory power was central to many of the House’s clashes with the 
 
 45. For detailed accounts of the St. Clair investigation and the events giving rise to it, see 
ERNEST J. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:  A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 36–
37 (1928); DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT:  
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9–12 (2016); George C. Chalou, St. Clair’s 
Defeat, 1792, in 1 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES:  A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, 1792–1974, at 3 
(Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975). 
 46. H.R. JOURNAL, 2d. Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1792). 
 47. Chalou, supra note 45, at 10–11. 
 48. Id. at 12–17. 
 49. An Act Making Alterations in the Treasury and War Departments, ch. 37, § 2, 1 Stat. 
279, 280 (1792). 
 50. Chalou, supra note 45, at 13. 
 51. KRINER & SCHICKLER, supra note 45, at 12. 
 52. Josh Chafetz, “In the Time of a Woman, Which Sex Was Not Capable of Mature 
Deliberation”:  Late Tudor Parliamentary Relations and Their Early Stuart Discontents, 25 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 188–91, 195–97 (2013). 
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Stuart monarchs.53  Indeed, by the late 1660s, some parliamentary grants of 
funds to the Crown came with provisions specifying record-keeping 
procedures, requiring that the records be open for public inspection, and even 
creating what we might anachronistically call an independent auditing board, 
with the authority to take testimony under oath and a requirement to report 
to both the King and Parliament.54 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, it was commonplace—naturally, 
primarily among opposition politicians—to refer to the House of Commons 
as the “grand inquest of the nation.”  Bolingbroke used the phrase in 1730,55 
and the following year the formulation was used in a speech in the House of 
Lords in support of a bill that would make pensioners of the Crown ineligible 
to sit in the House of Commons.56  In 1734, this conception of the lower 
house’s role was urged in debates in the Commons as a point in favor of more 
frequent parliamentary elections,57 and upon the opening of Parliament in 
1735, Speaker Arthur Onslow told his colleagues that, 
[t]his House is the grand inquest of the nation, appointed to inquire 
diligently, and to represent faithfully to the king, all the grievances of his 
people, and all the crimes and mismanagement of his servants; and 
therefore it must always be a breach of our fidelity to our sovereign, as well 
as a breach of our duty to his people, to approve blindly of the conduct of 
his servants [i.e., the government].58 
Perhaps most famously, the formulation was repeatedly invoked in the 
1741 debates over appointing a committee to inquire into the conduct of 
Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford, as prime minister.59  After James Hamilton, 
Viscount Limerick, moved for the appointment of a committee to investigate 
the previous twenty years of Walpole’s tenure,60 William Pitt the Elder 
responded to claims that the inquiry was, to borrow a phrase, a witch hunt: 
I have no great Occasion to answer what has been said, that no 
Parliamentary Inquiry ought ever to be set up, unless we are convinced that 
something has been done amiss.  Sir, the very Name given to this House of 
Parliament shews the contrary.  We are called the Grand Inquest of the 
 
 53. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:  LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 157–63, 268 (2017); Chafetz, supra note 52, at 197–99. 
 54. CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 48–49.  For the auditing board specifically, see Accounts 
of Public Moneys Act 1667, 19 & 20 Car. 2 c. 1 (Eng.). 
 55. HENRY ST. JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
(1730), in 1 THE WORKS OF LORD BOLINGBROKE 292, 332 (Philadelphia, Carey & Hart 1841). 
 56. 8 WILLIAM COBBETT, COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 848 
(London, Hansard 1811).  On the history of these statutory incompatibility provisions, see 
Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House:  The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of 
Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 188–90 (2008). 
 57. 9 COBBETT, supra note 56, at 421. 
 58. Id. at 673–74. 
 59. Admittedly, applying the title of “prime minister” to Walpole is somewhat 
anachronistic.  On the informality of the office of the prime minister until the twentieth century 
and therefore the contingency of identifying the “first” prime minister, see CHAFETZ, supra 
note 53, at 91–92. 
 60. As Hamilton’s peerage was Irish, it was at the time no bar to his sitting in the British 
House of Commons. 
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Nation, and as such it is our Duty to inquire into every Step of publick 
Management, either Abroad or at Home, in order to see that nothing has 
been done amiss.61 
Those who suggested otherwise “seem[ed] to mistake . . . the Difference 
between a Motion for an Impeachment, and a Motion for an Inquiry.”62  
Limerick’s motion failed by two votes,63 but he immediately introduced a 
second motion calling for an investigation that would only go back a 
decade.64  In support of this motion, Edward Digby noted reports that the 
Crown was “greatly in Debt” and unable to pay its bills:  “[T]his Report alone 
obliges us to inquire into it, if we have a Mind to act up to our Character as 
the Grand Inquest of the Nation.”65  Pitt spoke again, arguing that widespread 
public outrage was sufficient, albeit not necessary, to justify opening a 
parliamentary inquiry.66  Moreover, the state of public affairs could justify 
an inquiry even without any accusation of malfeasance:  “[T]he ill Posture of 
our Affairs both abroad and at home:  The melancholy Situation we are in:  
The Distress we are now reduced to, is of itself a sufficient Cause for an 
Inquiry, even supposing [Walpole] were accused of no particular Crime or 
Misconduct.”67  Pitt and his colleagues were successful on their second try:  
the House narrowly authorized the inquiry.68  While the investigation itself 
produced no further consequences for Walpole, the same pressure that 
prompted the inquiry also led him to resign from the King’s service.69 
Later in the eighteenth century, William Blackstone would explicitly tie 
the “grand inquest” formulation to the House of Commons’ role in 
impeachment,70 and no doubt it has important substantive ties to 
impeachment.  But the remarks surrounding the Walpole investigation make 
it clear that the formulation was understood in mid-eighteenth-century 
London to refer to a much more expansive power of investigation in the 
public interest.71  What’s more, colonial American legislatures were 
especially attentive students of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Crown-
Parliament relations,72 and they seized on investigation as a form of pushback 
 
 61. 13 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 172 (London, Richard 
Chandler 1743). 
 62. Id. at 170. 
 63. Id. at 182. 
 64. Id. at 188–91. 
 65. Id. at 201. 
 66. Id. at 210–11. 
 67. Id. at 211. 
 68. Id. at 216. 
 69. Stephen Taylor, Walpole, Robert, First Earl of Orford (1676–1745), OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY (Jan. 3, 2008), https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/28601 
[https://perma.cc/44QM-JPZ9]. 
 70. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259. 
 71. For a broader caution against taking Blackstone as fully representative of the common-
law tradition—and against taking Blackstone to be the sole source of American knowledge 
about that tradition—see generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006). 
 72. CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 4–5. 
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against royal officials.73  As a result of American frustrations with colonial 
governors, early American state constitutions were dominated by the 
legislatures.74  But even though these state executives were relatively 
toothless and generally appointed by state legislatures,75 those legislatures 
nevertheless maintained a number of independent checks on the executive, 
including the power of investigation.76  Two early republican state 
constitutions—the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New 
Hampshire Constitution of 1784, which was patterned on its Massachusetts 
predecessor—both referred to the lower chamber of the legislature as “the 
grand inquest” of the state, specifically in the context of impeachment.77 
A.  Authority for Congressional Oversight 
Early discussions of the new American Constitution picked up on the 
“grand inquest” language.  At the Philadelphia Convention, a draft from the 
Committee of Detail specified that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be 
the grand Inquest of this Nation; and all Impeachments shall be made by 
them.”78  This link was echoed by Hamilton, writing as Publius, who 
extended the description to both chambers.  Rather than labeling the House 
itself as the grand inquest, he described impeachment as “a method of 
NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men” and inquired, “If this be 
the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the 
representatives of the nation themselves?”79  And other early American 
politicians evinced an understanding, similar to that expressed by Pitt earlier 
in the century, that the idea of a legislative house as a “grand inquest” extends 
well beyond impeachment.  George Mason argued at the Philadelphia 
Convention that Congress should be required to meet once a year because 
“the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers, which 
 
 73. See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 208 (1943) (noting that colonial assemblies “tended to hold many local officials to 
a large measure of responsibility, and to call them to account when they failed in the 
performance of their duty”); EBERLING, supra note 45, at 17–21; TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND 
INQUEST:  THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 10–11 (1955). 
 74. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
149 (rev. ed. 1998) (“Americans’ emasculation of their governors lay at the heart of their 
constitutional reforms of 1776.”). 
 75. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY 
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 266–67, 270 
(Rita & Robert Kimber trans., expanded ed. 2001). 
 76. See CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 170–71; TAYLOR, supra note 73, at 12. 
 77. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § 3, art. 6; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, art. 17. 
 78. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 154 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  This connection was remarked upon in at least 
one state ratifying convention as well. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 44 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1907) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (Archibald Maclaine in the North Carolina ratifying 
convention:  “[The impeachment] clause empowers the House of Representatives, which is 
the grand inquest of the Union at large, to bring great offenders to justice.”). 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  It 
should be noted that Hamilton was discussing the powers of the Senate in this essay, so there 
is no doubt that he means to refer to both chambers. 
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can not safely be long kept in a State of suspension.”80  In his famous 1790–
1791 “Lectures on Law,” James Wilson likewise used the term in a more 
capacious sense:  “The house of representatives, for instance, form the grand 
inquest of the state.  They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both 
from men and things.”81  And in the House itself in 1794, Massachusetts 
Federalist Fisher Ames, who had been a delegate to the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention, defended the House’s authority to inquire into and 
criticize the proliferation of Democratic-Republican clubs,82 referring to “the 
character of this House as the grand inquest of the Nation, as those who are 
not only to impeach those who perpetrate offence, but to watch and give the 
alarm for the prevention of such attempts.”83 
The “grand inquest” formulation served a powerful justificatory role 
because there is no explicit constitutional authorization for congressional 
oversight.  As we have seen, the formulation was tied to the impeachment 
power84 but not limited to it.  Other constitutional powers have also long been 
understood to give rise to attendant investigatory powers, including the 
power to legislate,85 the power to appropriate,86 the power to structure the 
other two branches of government,87 and the Senate’s power to confirm 
principal officers88 and ratify treaties.89  Most expansively of all, each 
chamber has the authority to propose constitutional amendments;90 even 
information-gathering activities aimed at currently unconstitutional purposes 
could therefore be constitutionally justified as an ancillary of this 
congressional power.  The reasonable exercise of any of these powers 
requires the ability to acquire information—as James Landis put it in 1926, 
“To deny Congress power to acquaint itself with facts is equivalent to 
requiring it to prescribe remedies in darkness.”91  The Supreme Court has 
reasoned structurally to a similar conclusion:  in McGrain v. Daugherty,92 a 
 
 80. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 78, at 199 (Madison’s recounting); accord id. at 
206 (King’s recounting). 
 81. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part II, Chapter 1:  Of the Constitutions of the 
United States and of Pennsylvania—of the Legislative Department, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS 
OF JAMES WILSON 829, 848 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
 82. On the growth of Democratic-Republican clubs and the fear they inspired in the 
Federalists, see Matthew Schoenbachler, Republicanism in the Age of Democratic Revolution:  
The Democratic-Republican Societies of the 1790s, 18 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 237, 237–38 
(1998). 
 83. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 930 (1794). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6–7; id. art. II, § 4. 
 85. Id. art. I, §§ 7–8. 
 86. Id. § 9, cl. 7. 
 87. Id. § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 1. 
 88. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. art. V. 
 91. James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 209 (1926);  see also J. W. Fulbright, Congressional 
Investigations:  Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441 (1951) 
(“The power to investigate is one of the most important attributes of the Congress.  It is perhaps 
also the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative function.”). 
 92. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
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1927 case arising out of the Teapot Dome scandal, Justice Willis Van 
Devanter, for a unanimous Court (with Justice Harlan Stone recused), held 
that, “[w]e are of opinion that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce 
it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”93  
Van Devanter’s reasoning sounded in the same structural logic that Landis 
had appealed to only a year earlier: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of 
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to 
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be 
had to others who do possess it.  Experience has taught that mere requests 
for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which 
is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of 
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed . . . .  Thus there is ample 
warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional provisions which 
commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include 
this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.94 
This holding has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.95  Crucially, this 
power to investigate as an ancillary of Congress’s other powers must be 
understood capaciously.  Before a chamber can have a specific piece of 
legislation—or the appropriation of specific funds or the impeachment of a 
specific officer—in mind, it must already have basic familiarity with the 
existing state of the world.96  What’s more, oversight can often deter 
undesirable conduct, thereby obviating the need for some further remedy.97  
 
 93. Id. at 174. 
 94. Id. at 175. 
 95. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the 
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.  That power is broad.  
It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed 
or possibly needed statutes.  It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political 
system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.  It comprehends probes into 
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”); 
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“This Court has often noted 
that the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws . . . .  Issuance of subpoenas 
such as the one in question here has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its 
power to investigate.”); Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (quoting McGrain 
and Watkins to similar effect). 
 96. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
 97. See William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 799 (“Congress’s power to investigate plays a critical 
role in the checks and balances of U.S. democracy.  Congressional investigations serve as a 
deterrent to wrongdoing.  Without some outside check on the Executive Branch, there would 
be little to discourage unscrupulous officials from acting in their own, and not in the nation’s, 
best interests.”); Marty Lederman, Can Congress Investigate Whether the President Has 
Conflicts of Interest, Is Compromised by Russia, or Has Violated the Law?, BALKINIZATION 
(July 29, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/can-congress-investigate-whether.html 
[https://perma.cc/2U4Z-Y6PZ] (“[C]ongressional inquiry and oversight is an absolutely 
critical deterrent to executive wrongdoing and maladministration . . . .  As virtually anyone 
who’s worked in the executive branch will attest, the prospect (or threat) of having to explain 
one’s self, and one’s decisions, to a congressional chair or staff, or in congressional hearings 
under the harsh glare of network lights, has a significant impact on how one performs her work 
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So long as such a remedy would be within Congress’s power, so too is the 
investigation.98 
In addition to oversight’s basis in constitutional structure, there are a 
number of statutory provisions that offer explicit or implicit authority for 
congressional oversight.  Most prominent is the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946,99 which created an oversight obligation on the part of the 
standing committees in both chambers: 
To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem 
necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by 
the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of 
which is within the jurisdiction of such committee . . . .100 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970101 modified that language to 
require each standing committee to “review and study, on a continuing basis, 
the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, 
the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.”102 
In addition to statutizing not just a right but a duty to engage in oversight, 
the 1946 and 1970 acts also created a number of mechanisms and processes 
for facilitating and structuring that oversight.  These included the 
regularization and professionalization of both committee and member 
staffing;103 the direction of increased staff and resources to nonpartisan 
institutions, including the Legislative Reference Service (renamed the 
Congressional Research Service in the 1970 Act), the Offices of Legislative 
Counsel, and the General Accounting Office (later renamed the Government 
Accountability Office);104 and requirements that committees issue biennial 
oversight reports105 and ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, programs 
 
as an official—it tempers any impulses to overstep, cut corners, or disregard norms designed 
to protect the public interest.”). 
 98. In 2020, the Supreme Court added a series of side constraints on the enforceability of 
congressional subpoenas for the president’s personal information. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035–
36.  Although this decision was lamentable, see Josh Chafetz, Don’t Be Fooled, Trump Is a 
Winner in the Supreme Court Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/trump-taxes-supreme-court-.html 
[https://perma.cc/9QHB-FLAA], it did not affect oversight of the president’s official conduct, 
nor did it extend to persons beyond the president. 
 99. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.  For discussions of the 1946 Act more generally, see 
CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 292–95; ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM:  INSTITUTIONAL 
INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 140–50 (2001); Roger H. 
Davidson, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357 (1990). 
 100. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 136, 60 Stat. at 832. 
 101. Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140.  For discussions of the 1970 Act more generally, 
see CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 294–95; SCHICKLER, supra note 99, at 213–17; Walter Kravitz, 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375 (1990). 
 102. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, § 118, 84 Stat. at 1156. 
 103. See CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 292–94; Davidson, supra note 99, at 367–69; Kravitz, 
supra note 101, at 379, 383, 388. 
 104. See CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 293–94. 
 105. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, § 118, 84 Stat. at 1156. 
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within their jurisdictions were subject to annual appropriations.106  
Moreover, myriad other statutes contain provisions meant to encourage or 
facilitate oversight, ranging from protections for whistleblowers,107 to the 
creation of the Congressional Budget Office,108 to requiring departments and 
agencies to have inspectors general and chief financial officers.109 
In addition to constitutional and statutory authorizations for oversight, 
each chamber also authorizes oversight in its cameral rules, promulgated 
pursuant to the Rules of Proceedings Clause.110  In the House, the rules 
provide each standing committee with “general oversight responsibilities” 
for laws and programs within its jurisdiction.111  These responsibilities 
include a requirement that each committee “review and study on a continuing 
basis” laws, programs, agencies, and subject matters within its 
jurisdiction.112  The various standing committees are also required to submit 
oversight plans for a Congress by March 1 of the first session of that 
Congress,113 and they are required to include a summary of their oversight 
activities in their required report at the end of each Congress.114  The rules 
also provide for the payment of costs associated with conducting oversight 
investigations and producing bound copies of testimony and other evidence 
taken at oversight hearings.115  A number of committees are also given 
“special oversight functions”—that is, jurisdiction to conduct oversight into 
matters that fall within the legislative jurisdiction of another committee.116  
(For instance, the Armed Services Committee has special oversight 
jurisdiction over matters “relating to international arms control and 
disarmament and the education of military dependents in schools,”117 matters 
falling within the legislative jurisdictions of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and the Education and Labor Committee, respectively.118)  Perhaps most 
 
 106. Id. § 253(a)–(b), 84 Stat. at 1174–75.  On the ways in which annual appropriations 
facilitate congressional control over the executive, see CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 61–66. 
 107. E.g., Lloyd-La Follette Act, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912); Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 101(a), 92 Stat. 1111, 1116–17; Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16; Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 701–02, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413–
17. 
 108. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 
tit. II, 88 Stat. 297, 302–05. 
 109. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 5(b), 92 Stat. 1101, 1103; Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, § 102(b)(3), 104 Stat. 2838, 2839; id. 
§ 202, 104 Stat. at 2840; id. § 205, 104 Stat. at 2844; id. § 301, 104 Stat. at 2847–48; id. 
§ 303(e), 104 Stat. at 2852. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 111. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116TH CONG., R. X(2)(a) (2019), 
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-Rules-
Clerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH6T-R3HQ].  The jurisdiction of each standing committee is 
specified in Rule X(1). 
 112. Id. R. X(2)(b)(1). 
 113. Id. R. X(2)(d). 
 114. Id. R. XI(1)(d). 
 115. Id. R. XI(1)(b)(1), XI(1)(c). 
 116. Id. R. X(3). 
 117. Id. R. X(3)(b). 
 118. See id. R. X(1)(i), X(1)(e). 
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importantly, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform is given roving 
authority to “conduct investigations of any matter without regard to [any 
rules provision] conferring jurisdiction over the matter to another standing 
committee.”119  Finally, the rules provide that the Speaker, with the approval 
of the House, can appoint an ad hoc oversight committee to review matters 
falling within the jurisdiction of multiple standing committees.120 
Oversight in the Senate is structured along relatively similar lines.  The 
standing committees are required to conduct oversight into matters within 
their legislative jurisdiction;121 they have similar reporting requirements to 
those in the House;122 and various committees are given “comprehensive” 
authority to study certain matters, akin to “special oversight functions” in the 
House.123  The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee has a general oversight duty akin to that of the House Oversight 
Committee,124 a function that in large part is carried out by its Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations.125 
B.  Tools and Methods of Oversight 
Although, as the previous section suggested, committees are the primary 
engines of congressional oversight, individual entrepreneurial members126 
can also play a key role.  Members can send information requests to agency 
officials (or to private persons or entities), although the requestees are under 
no legal obligation to respond.127  Still, agency officials in particular tend to 
be quite alive to the wisdom of not unnecessarily angering members of 
 
 119. Id. R. X(4)(c)(2). 
 120. Id. R. X(2)(e). 
 121. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XXVI(8)(a) (2013), 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTM3 
-78GC].  Committee jurisdiction is specified in Rule XXV.  Because the Senate regards itself 
as a “continuing body,” its rules continue in effect from Congress to Congress unless changed, 
which explains why the most recent version of its rules was published several Congresses ago. 
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 1401, 1410–18 (2010). 
 122. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XXVI(8)(b). 
 123. See, e.g., id. R. XXV(1)(a)(2), XXV(1)(c)(2), XXV(1)(d)(2). 
 124. Id. R. XXV(1)(k)(2). 
 125. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations grew out of the Truman committee, 
chaired by Harry S. Truman (D-MO) during World War II and given jurisdiction to “expos[e] 
waste, fraud, and abuse in the war effort and war profiteering.” Historical Background, 
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS 1, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/PSI%20Historical%20Background%20(for%20website)%20Jan%202015%20update.pd
f [https://perma.cc/CH2U-JX2J] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).  Indeed, as Kriner and Schickler 
note, “Truman built his public reputation not through legislating, but by investigating.” 
KRINER & SCHICKLER, supra note 45, at 1.  In 1948, the committee that Truman had chaired 
until 1944 became a permanent subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the 
Executive Departments, the precursor to today’s Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs.  Most infamously, the subcommittee was chaired by Joseph McCarthy 
(R-WI) from 1953 to 1954.  Historical Background, supra, at 1; see also infra Part III(B). 
 126. On “entrepreneurship” by members of Congress, see SCHICKLER, supra note 99, at 
14–15, 250–52. 
 127. See ALISSA M. DOLAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT MANUAL 65 (2014). 
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Congress128 and are therefore generally responsive to such inquiries.129  
Moreover, members can on their own initiative travel to observe conditions 
around the country (or indeed internationally).  Recently, for example, a 
number of Democratic members traveled to migrant detention facilities along 
the U.S.-Mexico border.130  In an illuminating example of the interaction 
between oversight by individual members and oversight by committees, 
several of those members subsequently testified before the House Oversight 
Committee regarding what they had observed—including one member who 
did not serve on the Oversight Committee.131  At the other end of the 
spectrum from individual members, the entire House of Representatives can 
also conduct oversight via a “resolution of inquiry.”  These are privileged 
simple (i.e., single-chamber) resolutions, addressed to the head of any 
executive department; if the resolution is passed by the entire House, then the 
department head is “directed” to supply information to the House.132 
However, the vast majority of oversight is conducted by committees,133 
which have a variety of tools available for that purpose.  They generally begin 
 
 128. See CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 71–73 (discussing the research on agency 
responsiveness to Congress). 
 129. The Trump administration has proven less responsive to requests from individual 
members than have previous administrations (just as it has proven less responsive to requests 
and even subpoenas from committees).  This has provoked a bipartisan backlash. See Kevin 
Freking, Grassley Tells Trump He Can’t Ignore Requests for Information from Congress, PBS 
NEWS HOUR (June 9, 2017, 6:09 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/grassley-
tells-trump-cant-ignore-requests-information-congress [https://perma.cc/A9P6-WTZG]. 
 130. Priscilla Alvarez, Lawmakers, Including Ocasio-Cortez, Lash out Over Conditions 
Following Border Facility Tours, CNN (July 2, 2019, 8:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/ 
07/01/politics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-clint-texas-facility/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XPA9-ZT3K]. 
 131. Representatives Veronica Escobar (D-TX), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), 
Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) testified before the committee about 
their border visits. Grace Segers, Ocasio-Cortez Condemns “Manufactured” Cruelty by White 
House Immigration Policies, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2019, 5:56 AM), https:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/house-oversight-committee-holds-hearing-on-treatment-of-
migrants-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/KG9Z-CGUN].  Representative Escobar does not sit 
on the Oversight Committee. See Oversight and Reform Members, HOUSE COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & REFORM, https://oversight.house.gov/members [https://perma.cc/AP6D-6R52] 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
 132. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116TH CONG., R. XIII(7) (2019).  For a 
recent example of an introduced resolution of inquiry, see H.R. Res. 243, 116th Cong. (as 
reported by H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 4, 2019) (resolving “[t]hat the Attorney 
General of the United States is directed to transmit, to the House of Representatives, not later 
than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, copies of any document, record, 
audio recording, memorandum, correspondence, or other communication in his possession, or 
any portion thereof, that refers or relates to” various actions taken by former FBI Director 
Andrew McCabe with regard to investigations into President Trump). 
 133. In the discussion that follows, “a committee” generally means a majority of the 
members of the committee, although in some cases chairs are authorized to act unilaterally or 
with the consent of the ranking member.  However, federal law also provides that any seven 
members of the House Oversight Committee or any five members of the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs can request information from any executive 
agency, which “shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the committee,” a provision sometimes referred to as the “rule of seven.” 5 
U.S.C. § 2954.  The rule of seven provides the minority party memberships of these 
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with staffers collecting publicly available information, often aided by 
information provided by one or more of the statutorily created support 
agencies discussed above (the Congressional Research Service, the 
Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and 
agencies’ inspectors general).134  Committees can also make use of staff-
conducted sworn depositions:  in the House, the Oversight Committee is 
expressly authorized to take depositions;135 in the Senate, a number of 
committees have similar authority.136  After the initial information-gathering 
phase is complete (or at least underway), hearings themselves are a key tool 
of oversight, allowing members of Congress and staffers to obtain testimony 
from witnesses, to press them to explain inconsistencies or omissions, and to 
begin working out framings for the information that they have received.  For 
the most part, testimony and supporting information is voluntarily provided 
to the committees, especially by federal agencies, which both understand 
themselves to have a duty to provide information to Congress and understand 
that it is in their interest to stay on members’ good sides.137  Should 
information not be provided voluntarily, committees in both chambers have 
the power to issue subpoenas for documents and testimony, with the 
procedures for doing so specified in the committees’ own rules.138  The 
 
committees with a legal right to demand information from executive agencies.  While agencies 
have generally been responsive to rule of seven requests, the statute provides no explicit 
enforcement mechanism, and federal district courts have twice held that members of Congress 
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demand. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018); Waxman v. Thompson, 
No. CV04-3467, 2006 WL 8432224 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006). 
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 135. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116TH CONG., R. X(4)(c)(3)(A). 
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information requests is a significant outlier. See Pema Levy & Marisa Endicott, 6 Things the 
White House Won’t Give Congress—and How Democrats Can Fight Back, MOTHER JONES 
(May 13, 2019, 8:58 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/05/6-things-the-
white-house-wont-give-congress-and-how-democrats-can-fight-back/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6NS2-9EFL]; see also Jonathan H. Adler, McConnell and Chafetz on Trump’s Resistance to 
Congressional Oversight, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 3, 2019, 8:58 AM), https:// 
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McConnell and me on how the Trump administration has responded to oversight attempts in 
the 116th Congress). 
 138. See 2 U.S.C. § 190m; RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116TH CONG., R. 
XI(2)(m)(1)(B); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XXVI(1) (2013). 
548 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the congressional subpoena power,139 
and it has suggested that the standard for legal sufficiency of a congressional 
subpoena is easily met.  In Wilkinson v. United States,140 the Court 
announced a five-part test:  (1) Was the committee’s investigation authorized 
by Congress?; (2) Was the investigation pursuant to a valid legislative 
purpose?; (3) Was the specific inquiry pertinent to the subject matter of the 
investigation?; (4) Was the subpoena’s target contemporaneously apprised of 
the pertinency of the inquiry?; and (5) Did the investigation violate any of 
the target’s constitutional rights (e.g., First Amendment rights of free 
association and free speech, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, etc.)?141  As for the “valid legislative purpose” prong, the 
Court has long indicated both that any of Congress’s constitutional powers 
suffices to furnish such a purpose and that the authorization for the 
investigation need not specify the constitutional power on its face.142 
Information demands are backed by several mechanisms for forcing 
compliance.  Defiance of a valid subpoena constitutes contempt of Congress, 
which can be either criminally prosecuted143 or enforced by the 
congressional chamber itself via civil suit, arrest, or use of other 
congressional tools such as the power of the purse.144  A witness who lies 
under oath (whether in a hearing or in an authorized staff deposition) can be 
prosecuted for perjury,145 and even when not sworn, a willfully false 
statement given in the course of “any investigation or review, conducted 
pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or 
office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or 
Senate” is criminally punishable.146  (False statements, like refusing to 
comply with a subpoena, would also constitute contempt of Congress.) 
C.  Oversight Done “Right”:  The Consensus View 
To what end are members, committees, and chambers of Congress meant 
to use these oversight tools?  Recall the language used by participants and 
commentators across the political spectrum to describe what the hearings 
investigating President Trump should and should not be.  Any suggestion that 
the hearings were intended to be showy or theatrical came with a clear 
negative connotation.  Instead, they should be primarily receptive in nature:  
they should be aimed at drawing out new facts or at least new implications 
 
 139. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). 
 140. 365 U.S. 399 (1961). 
 141. Id. at 408–09.  As previously noted, in 2020 the Court added several new factors to be 
taken into account when a subpoena targets the personal papers of the president. See supra 
note 98. 
 142. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1897). 
 143. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194. 
 144. For a discussion of contempt of Congress generally and each chamber’s options for 
addressing it, see CHAFETZ, supra note 53, at 152–98. 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 
 146. Id. § 1001(c)(2). 
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of old facts.  If there were no new facts to be uncovered, that suggested that 
the hearings would be mere “theater” at best, a “circus” at worst.  This way 
of thinking about congressional hearings was certainly not new in 2019—it 
reflects a long-standing, cross-partisan, and cross-ideological consensus147 
about what it means to do oversight right. 
Consider the Congressional Research Service’s Oversight Manual, which 
defines oversight as “the review, monitoring, and supervision of the 
implementation of public policy,”148 a definition wholly focused on the 
receipt of information, not the dissemination of it.  Indeed, the Manual goes 
on to list ten purposes of oversight, none of which involves public 
communication in any way.149  Likewise, one of the canonical studies of 
congressional investigations describes their purpose as being “to obtain 
information, so that [the chamber’s] legislative functions may be discharged 
on an enlightened rather than a benighted basis.”150  It is therefore a 
perversion when this function is overtaken by a base desire for “publicity,” 
in which “[c]harge and counter-charge, the breath of scandal and the clash of 
personalities, make a better show than knotty problems of public policy.”151  
More recently, Maya Kornberg lamented that some recent hearings “have 
seemed more circus than serious investigation” but insisted that 
“congressional hearings are not just theater”—that is, they “can bring 
lawmakers diverse and analytical information.”152 
The idea that oversight is, above all, about finding facts has further 
implications:  if everyone is engaging in the enterprise in good faith, it should 
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be both bipartisan and civil.  After all, if the facts don’t care about your 
feelings, then finding the facts shouldn’t be contingent on your ideology or 
partisanship.  Of course, few are so naïve as to deny that good faith 
differences of interpretation will arise, but so long as finding and collating 
those facts remains at the heart of the enterprise, those differences can be 
cabined.  Crystalizing this view, retired Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and 
Richard Lugar (R-IN), who served a combined seventy-two years in the 
Senate, wrote in 2018 that, “[w]hen oversight hearings were held more for 
political purposes than for real fact-finding purposes, they didn’t work.  
Hearings like these may have been the exception rather than the rule, but they 
damaged Congress’ reputation.  They didn’t uncover the facts, and they 
didn’t have the confidence of the American people.”153  Likewise, one 
scholar of oversight has lamented that “some hearings—ones that could have 
addressed problems constructively—were used to promote partisan 
goals.”154  He went on to contrast the pursuit of partisan ends, on the one 
hand, with “constructive endeavors,” on the other.155  In this spirit, in honor 
of Senator Levin’s eight years chairing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations,156 the Levin Center at Wayne Law awards an annual Carl 
Levin Award for Effective Oversight.  The selection criteria include that the 
oversight activities led by the winner “must have been conducted on a 
bipartisan basis and the candidate must have played a significant role in 
ensuring the bipartisan nature of the investigation,” and “[t]he oversight 
investigation must have been focused on obtaining the facts underlying the 
subject of the investigation.”157 
To be clear, there are plenty of oversight activities in Congress that would 
qualify for this award.158  A recent study by Jason MacDonald noted that 
“much oversight is conducted on a bipartisan basis . . . during both divided 
and unified government,”159 and that “Democrats and Republicans . . . 
continued to work together in recent years on some oversight endeavors 
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while opposing one another on other oversight matters.”160  In addition, 
Maya Kornberg’s work analyzed hearings in several committees in both 
chambers in the 114th Congress (2015–2016) and found that witness 
testimony at these hearings tended to be at a high analytical level and 
ideologically balanced.161  Moreover, she found that, although some hearings 
were “theatrical,” others were “more ‘educational’ hearings on technical, 
uncontentious topics with nonpartisan experts” or “‘deliberative 
hearings’ . . . offer[ing] an opportunity to learn from and legitimize the 
perspectives of witnesses and fellow committee members with whom a 
member of Congress might ordinarily disagree.”162  In other words, even in 
a time of high partisan polarization, a great many congressional hearings live 
up to the consensus ideal. 
But what about the rest of it?  What about the hearings that Kornberg, 
reflecting the consensus view, dismisses as “theatrical”? 
II.  OVERSPEECH 
A few observers—perhaps not coincidentally, from the world of 
entertainment—have insisted on the value of the performative element of 
congressional hearings.  The New York Times’s chief television critic, for 
instance, argued that Robert Mueller should testify publicly because “there’s 
a power to images and voices on a screen . . . . TV events concentrate 
attention and focus.”163  At the same time, Academy Award-winning actor 
Robert De Niro wrote in an open letter to Mueller, “[Y]ou said that your 
investigation’s work ‘speaks for itself.’  It doesn’t . . . .  [T]he country needs 
to hear your voice.  Your actual voice.”164  Rejecting the anti-theatricality of 
the consensus view of oversight, the critic and the actor were making the case 
for congressional oversight as congressional overspeech. 
Overspeech is best understood not as something distinct from 
congressional oversight but rather as the use of the tools of oversight in ways 
that the consensus view regards as illegitimate.  It thus makes sense to speak 
in terms of the degree to which oversight hearings are best characterized as 
overspeech, rather than in terms of a binary.  So what are the indicia of 
overspeech?  In order of increasing controversiality, they are 
communicativity, performativity, and divisiveness.  Each will be addressed 
in turn below. 
A.  Communicativity 
On the consensus view, oversight is supposed to be about receiving facts.  
If a special counsel has already written a detailed report containing all the 
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relevant facts, then having him testify can serve no legitimate purpose.165  
Scholars166 and members of Congress167 alike have largely agreed that, in 
the words of Senators Levin and Lugar, oversight should be aimed at “real 
fact-finding.”168 
Of course, the proponents of the consensus view recognize that hearings 
communicate facts to the public.  But they are insistent that this 
communication is a by-product of public fact-finding, rather than a legitimate 
object to be pursued in its own right.  So, for example, the CRS Oversight 
Manual, which does not list any form of public communication as one of the 
purposes of oversight,169 nevertheless devotes several pages to 
“Communicating with the Media.”170  Likewise, Senator Levin and Elise 
Bean suggest ten metrics for measuring the quality of an investigation, the 
last of which is, “[w]as the investigation able to attract attention from 
policymakers and the public?”171  In other words, the consensus view 
understands the purpose of oversight to be the discovery of facts; 
communication of those facts to the public is distinctly secondary. 
But there has long been another view of oversight.  In 1885, a doctoral 
candidate at Johns Hopkins University named Woodrow Wilson argued that 
Congress failed in its oversight responsibilities precisely because its 
oversight involved too little overspeech: 
An effective representative body . . . ought, it would seem, not only to 
speak the will of the nation, which Congress does, but also to lead it to its 
conclusions, to utter the voice of its opinions, and to serve as its eyes in 
superintending all matters of government,—which Congress does not 
do.172 
He went on to declare that “[i]t is the proper duty of a representative body to 
look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what 
it sees . . . .  The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to 
its legislative function.”173  Here is a full-throated argument for public 
communication, not simply as a by-product of oversight, but rather as its 
animating purpose.  And, importantly, Wilson is making an argument for the 
argumentative use of oversight tools:  “[W]hen earnestly and purposefully 
conducted, [congressional speech] clears the public mind and shapes the 
demands of public opinion.”174  Wilson is not here claiming that 
investigations can simply uncover facts and publicize them.  Facts on their 
own are inert:  they neither do anything nor do they require any particular 
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response.  Facts, as Wilson recognized, have motivating power only when 
they are presented (explicitly or implicitly) as part of a larger narrative.175  
Thus, the congressional “informing function” is necessarily an attempt to 
shape public views. 
In this, Wilson was evincing a sophisticated view of the relationship 
between institutional politics and mass politics.  As David Mayhew has more 
recently emphasized, “political activity takes place before the eyes of an 
appraising public—not in a Washington, D.C., realm that can be theoretically 
or empirically isolated.”176  Rather, politics within and between institutions 
takes place in the public sphere177—and, indeed, in interbranch conflicts, it 
will generally be the institution that wins the public over to its side that 
emerges stronger.178  And this is not simply about crude electoral ties.  We 
are accustomed to seeing even second-term presidents publicly campaign for 
their positions in interbranch conflicts, and we are accustomed as well to 
thinking about the ways in which reservoirs of public support empower the 
judiciary to stand up to the other branches or the ways in which concern about 
maintaining public support pushes judges towards reticence.  In short, we get 
a descriptively much richer (albeit less parsimonious) understanding of 
national politics if we think in terms of continuous feedback effects between 
institutional politics, electoral politics, interest group politics, and all of the 
other parts of the political universe.  But the consensus view of oversight 
implicitly rests on a much less robustly interactive model:  it presupposes that 
the behaviors and interactions of political institutions can fruitfully be 
discussed in isolation from the interaction between political elites and their 
publics.  Recall, in this regard, Telford Taylor’s distinction between the 
salutary and enlightening discussion of “knotty problems of public policy,” 
on the one hand, and the base desire for “publicity” on the other.179 
Thinking in terms of overspeech helps to foreground the communicative 
use of oversight as a legitimate tool of constitutional politics.  In facing a 
question like whether a particular witness should be called to testify (for 
example, Robert Mueller in the House investigation or John Bolton in the 
Senate impeachment trial), it counsels us to focus, not primarily on whether 
his testimony would be likely to produce any new facts or even new 
interpretations of facts, but rather on whether the hearing at which he testified 
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would be likely to shape public views—including, perhaps, the views of 
some particular subsets of the public—in a meaningful way.180 
It also, of course, directs our attention to the media of communication 
through which public views of congressional activity are shaped.  Effective 
overspeakers will necessarily pay attention to the media environment in 
which they operate and will shape their behavior so as to increase the 
likelihood of favorable coverage.181  This means that, while overspeech 
occurs in all media environments—indeed, the two case studies in Part III are 
deliberately situated in circumstances very different from today and from one 
another—the particular forms and techniques that characterize effective 
overspeech will change over time.182 
It may be difficult to render any confident judgments on the long-term 
effects of the congressional investigations into President Trump,183 but we 
do have significant evidence that congressional overspeech moves public 
opinion.  As Mayhew noted in 2005, “a [congressional] probe can sometimes 
gain the attention of the public, weigh down the White House, trigger 
resignations of leading officials, and register a long-term impact on public 
opinion and government policy.”184  He identified thirty-one “congressional 
committee ‘exposure probes’ of the executive branch that dr[e]w 
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considerable publicity” between 1946 and 1990,185 and he found that each of 
them “gave a president some real trouble.”186  This “trouble” ranged from 
the resignation of administration officials (including, of course, President 
Richard Nixon himself) to bad press during election campaigns.187  More 
recently, Doug Kriner and Eric Schickler have conducted a more systematic 
survey of investigations into the executive branch and have come to a similar 
conclusion regarding their effect on the administration.  Analyzing both 
decades of public opinion survey data and original survey experiments, they 
found that congressional investigations of the president “systematically 
depress presidential job approval ratings.”188  This, in turn, can “reduce [the 
president’s] political leverage, and thereby provide at least a partial 
counterweight to presidential power.”189  More specifically, looking at all 
congressional committee investigations of alleged executive branch 
misconduct between 1953 and 2014, they found that “increasing the number 
of days of investigative hearings in a month from 0 to 20, slightly less than a 
two standard deviation shift, decreases presidential approval by 
approximately 2.5%.”190  These results were essentially the same regardless 
of whether the investigation was conducted in the House or the Senate191 and 
regardless of whether there was unified or divided government.192  
Additional survey experiments strengthened the conclusion that the publicity 
surrounding the congressional investigation itself, not simply publicity 
around the alleged executive misconduct, drove a significant amount of this 
shift in public opinion.193 
These shifts in public opinion, in turn, drive not only election outcomes 
but also the behavior of institutionally sited actors in between elections.194  
This can happen in several ways.  For one, the public reaction to legislative 
overspeech may in turn make it politically easier for Congress to pass 
executive-curtailing legislation,195 refuse to confirm executive branch 
nominees,196 trim or restructure executive branch appropriations,197 or even 
impeach.198  Moreover, presidents, anticipating these reactions from 
Congress, may preemptively alter their behavior in light of the public’s 
response to some instance of overspeech, in an attempt to stave off a more 
severe congressional response.199  Finally, and most broadly, overspeech 
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may have collateral consequences in reallocating power across the branches, 
even in policy areas unrelated to the overspeech itself, by sapping the 
political capital a president relies on and by enhancing the political capital of 
congressional actors.200  As an example, consider that President Ronald 
Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court was hampered by 
Reagan’s unpopularity at the time, which, in turn, was in no small part a 
function of the Iran-Contra hearings that had recently concluded.201 
In short, the communicative use of oversight tools has often served as a 
significant driving force in American constitutional politics. 
B.  Performativity 
It would be a strange account of oversight—or, indeed, of any political 
activity—to acknowledge that it was centrally concerned with public 
communication and yet require it to be indifferent as to the effectiveness of 
that communication.  Humans are seldom moved by logos alone.  Ethos and 
pathos are at least as significant in changing both minds and behavior.202  
Much of what political actors do in their public communication—at least, if 
they’re any good at it—is make appeals both to their own authority (i.e., 
ethical arguments) and to their audience’s emotions (i.e., pathetic 
arguments).203 
But the consensus view of oversight is almost entirely logocentric.  If the 
lodestar of good oversight is the finding of facts, then the nature of their 
presentation should be largely irrelevant.  Facts are facts, regardless of 
whether they’re written in a report or spoken in a gravelly baritone.  Appeals 
to emotion only get in the way of facts—that has been the essence of the 
critique of poetics since at least Plato.204  And of course this idea is at the 
core of the uniformly pejorative use of performance-based descriptions of 
oversight.  Even Kriner and Schickler, who have written the definitive recent 
work on the communicative uses of oversight, presented their findings as 
evidence that oversight hearings are not “mere political theater.”205 
And yet, theatricality is inevitably enmeshed with politics.  As sociologist 
Jeffrey Alexander has written in the context of presidential elections, 
“Candidates work to present compelling performances of civil competence 
to citizen audiences at a remove not only geographically but also emotionally 
and morally . . . . [I]n a democratic society it is the attribution of 
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meaningfulness that determines who will exercise power.”206  What shapes 
a campaign’s success is not whether the candidate is the embodiment of 
attractive ideals but rather whether she is perceived as such:  “Being truthful, 
honest, and fair are discursive claims; whether these claims take root is a 
matter of performative success.”207  Or, more expansively, candidates 
succeed if their performances are “structured in a manner that evokes our 
concerns, builds pictures in our minds, and allows us to share their worldly 
visions.”208  Importantly, the fact that something is theatrical does not make 
it untrue—even the truth needs to be performed to be believed.  Or, as veteran 
political journalist Jodi Kantor told Alexander about the 2008 presidential 
campaign, “It’s theatrical even when it’s incredibly authentic.”209 
What is true of presidential electoral politics is equally true of interbranch 
politics.  Performativity is both central to the practice and not necessarily in 
conflict with authenticity or veracity.210  Consider the constitutive elements 
of a theatrical performance.211  First, there are the actors themselves.  There’s 
a reason Mueller’s testimony was carried live on network television, while 
plenty of other oversight hearings vie for space on one of the C-SPAN 
channels.  Casting a famous actor is often the best way to ensure an audience.  
Sometimes committees take this quite literally:  “Committee leaders have 
learned that celebrity witnesses at committee hearings draw more press (and 
sometimes more committee members) than experts and bureaucrats.  So actor 
Ben Affleck is invited to speak at a hearing on the Congo, and comedian 
Stephen Colbert testifies at a hearing on immigration reform.”212  But even 
without entertainment industry professionals, some actors are clearly a bigger 
draw than others, and good casting is an important part of any production.  
Moreover, the question of casting goes beyond simply the actors’ fame; their 
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suitability for the role is also an important consideration.  Commentators 
noted, for example, that the career diplomats who testified before the House 
Intelligence Committee in the Trump impeachment proceedings “resembled 
a prep-school headmaster, tough but fair and near impossible to discredit” 
with an “anchorman voice,”213 or a “badass woman of the world, who chose 
to serve her country in the more remote and dangerous corners of the planet” 
and was “calm and measured, firm but not angry, as she delivered her 
devastating account.”214 
Next, there is the scenery.  Where the action takes place matters, because 
a performance that comes across as sublime in one setting can come across 
as farcical in another.  The physical trappings of Congress—both the 
chambers themselves and the committee rooms—are meant to project a sense 
of seriousness, purpose, and power.  The coat of arms of the United States is 
generally somewhere on the walls, American flags are sprinkled liberally 
about, and the décor is generally dark woods and leather furniture.  The 
gravitas of the scenery alone has significant power—and can be arranged to 
have even more.  In 1805, Aaron Burr—then in his final days as vice 
president and president of the Senate—sought to use the impeachment trial 
of Federalist Justice Samuel Chase to rehabilitate his own reputation.  Burr 
needed the good publicity:  his fellow Democratic-Republicans remained 
irate that he had refused to step aside when he and Thomas Jefferson tied in 
the Electoral College in 1800, and Federalists remained irked that he had 
killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel the previous year.  Scene-setting at the 
Chase impeachment trial was a big part of Burr’s public relations effort.  As 
Richard Ellis noted, Burr arranged the Senate to “look[] more like a theater 
than a court room,” including by building additional galleries for the 
occasion.215  Connecticut Federalist Senator Uriah Tracy described the 
chamber as “now fitted up in a style beyond anything which has ever 
appeared in this country.”216  Over a thousand spectators watched the drama 
of Chase’s acquittal,217 and Burr’s scenery may well have contributed to the 
“dignified and impartial” air that won Burr the respect of even some of the 
Federalists.218 
For a more recent example of scene-setting, consider President Trump’s 
2019 State of the Union address:  it was scheduled to take place on January 
29 of that year.  However, as the date approached, the federal government 
was in the middle of a lengthy shutdown, largely occasioned by disagreement 
between the White House and the Democratic-controlled House over funding 
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for a wall on the Mexican border.  In the context of the shutdown, Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) rescinded the invitation for Trump to deliver the speech 
in the House chamber on the previously appointed date.  Trump was upset 
and pressed Pelosi to reverse course once again, but when she held firm, he 
agreed to postpone the address until after the shutdown.219  Importantly for 
our purposes here, Trump could have chosen to give the speech in the 
Republican-controlled (but physically smaller and less imposing) Senate 
chamber or from the White House (or, for that matter, not at all).  But he did 
not, tweeting that “there is no venue that can compete with the history, 
tradition and importance of the House Chamber.”220  In other words, scenery 
matters. 
Consider next the costuming.  Before characters open their mouths, their 
attire can tell you a great deal about them.  In the arena of institutional 
politics, there tends to be a fairly conservative dress code.  For male 
politicians, dark business suits and ties are the norm.  Female politicians face 
a more fraught sartorial landscape, defined by the simultaneous pressure to 
appear both stereotypically feminine and powerful,221 a gendered double 
standard that leads to significantly more discussion of women’s costuming 
choices than men’s.222  Certain types of political actors also have more 
elaborate dress codes:  most prominently, judges are expected to wear robes.  
And some costuming fads can become nearly irresistible at times.  For 
example, for several years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
nearly all political actors were expected to wear American flag lapel pins.223  
Deviations from the sartorial norm often draw notice,224 which makes them 
a potentially powerful way to send a message.  At the (delayed)225 2019 State 
of the Union address, nearly all of the eighty-nine Democratic women wore 
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white, in a nod to the early twentieth-century suffrage movement.226  The 
effect was striking:  a concentrated sea of white every time cameras panned 
the chamber, with the effect that it was almost impossible for commentators 
not to talk about why the members had dressed the way they had.  The New 
York Times’s chief fashion critic declared admiringly that, “[a]s a piece of 
political theater, the white was strikingly effective.  On a night when the role 
of the audience in the chamber was to listen and, maybe, stand and applaud 
(or sit and look disappointed), the women still managed to make themselves 
heard.”227  In that context, being heard required first being seen, and it was 
their costuming choices that ensured that the Democratic representatives 
were seen.  (In an attempt to override the Democratic women’s message, 
Donald Trump Jr. appealed to an alternative costuming tradition, tweeting 
that there was “not one American flag pin among” the members wearing 
white.228  Observers quickly pointed out that photos of the Trump family at 
the speech did not show them wearing the pins either.)229 
The communicative use of attire is on occasion noticeable in the departure 
from the business attire norm in committee hearings as well.  When former 
Turing Pharmaceuticals CEO Martin Shkreli was subpoenaed to appear 
before the House Oversight Committee in 2016, he did not wear a tie—a fact 
widely noted in the press as being of a piece with his generally dismissive 
attitude toward the hearing.230  In the opposite direction, when Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg, a notoriously casual dresser, testified before the 
Senate Commerce and Judiciary Committees in the aftermath of revelations 
about his platform’s sloppy handling of users’ data and its role in foreign 
meddling in the 2016 presidential election, it was widely noted that he wore 
an “I’m Sorry Suit.”231  And when Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman 
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testified in the Trump impeachment inquiry, it was notable that he did so in 
his Army dress uniform, despite the fact that he did not wear a uniform in his 
day job at the National Security Council.232  As one commentator noted, the 
uniform was meant to convey that Vindman “stood aside from partisan 
politics, . . . prized country above self, . . . [and] understood testifying as a 
duty.”233 
Members, too, make costuming decisions.  For instance, a number of 
members regularly wear cowboy boots in an effort to signal both regional 
identity and a certain affinity for rugged individualism.234  Other members 
have made costuming choices on especially high-profile occasions to make 
a statement about diversity and inclusiveness.  At the opening of the 116th 
Congress in 2019, Representative Debra Haaland (D-NM), a Native 
American, wore turquoise jewelry and traditional Pueblo attire to her 
swearing in, and Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), a Palestinian-
American, chose to be sworn in wearing a thobe.235 
In addition to witnesses and members, the audience for hearings 
occasionally comes on stage through the medium of costume.  For instance, 
the anti-war group Code Pink made their attire such an effective part of their 
message that, on at least one occasion, activists were kicked out of a 
committee hearing based solely on their pink clothing, before they even had 
a chance to engage in any disruptive behavior.236  And in a stunt that has 
garnered significant media attention since 2017, Ian Madrigal has repeatedly 
dressed up as Rich Uncle Pennybags (the mascot of the Monopoly board 
game) and sat behind CEOs and Trump administration officials as they 
testified, frequently in the same television frame as the witness, “adjusting a 
monocle or brandishing a faux $100 bill.”237  Madrigal’s costuming choice 
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Is Photobombing the Senate’s Equifax Hearing, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:28 PM), 
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almost certainly made more of an impact on more people than anything said 
by either the witnesses or the committee members at those hearings. 
Next, consider props.  A well-utilized prop can reinforce an argument that 
is being made verbally, hint at something not said, or even substitute for 
words entirely.  And it can do so in a way that communicates more effectively 
than words alone.  When Attorney General Barr refused to testify before the 
House Judiciary Committee about his handling of Mueller’s report, 
Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN) brought a bucket of (cold) Kentucky 
Fried Chicken to the early morning hearing and began eating it.  As The 
Washington Post noted, “The clicks of cameras suddenly echoed throughout 
the room as watchers chuckled at his insinuation that Barr was too afraid to 
show up for questioning.”238  Indeed, Cohen’s creative use of a prop earned 
him two mentions on that week’s episode of Saturday Night Live239—a level 
of publicity that would have been unlikely without the chicken.  And when 
President Trump chose to use his 2020 State of the Union address—delivered 
the day before his acquittal in the Senate impeachment trial—as an argument 
for reelection, Speaker Pelosi made a point of tearing up her copy of his 
remarks in full view of the cameras.240  That use of a prop garnered far more 
attention in the speech’s aftermath than the Democrats’ official response. 
Finally, of course, there is the script itself.  This includes the logos-heavy 
material that is so central to the consensus account of oversight, but it also 
includes more than that.  It includes emotional (i.e., pathetic) appeals—
bringing forward witnesses with heartrending (or, alternatively, joyful and 
inspiring) stories to help “put a human face” on facts that might otherwise be 
dry, dull, and unmotivating.  It can include ethical appeals as well.  Although 
members of Congress are usually not sworn in when they testify before 
congressional committees, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-
NY) did request to be sworn in when she testified before the House Oversight 
Committee (on which she sits) about conditions she had observed at the 
southern border.241  When asked why she had chosen to be sworn, Ocasio-
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Cortez tweeted that it was because the “GOP has been stating that I am lying 
about the translated accounts of migrants at the border.”242  In other words, 
asking to be sworn was a dramatic gesture intended to inspire a sense in the 
audience that this character is trustworthy—a classical form of ethical 
argumentation. 
The scripting of overspeech can also include dramatically timed plot 
twists, as when Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) in 2007 elicited surprising 
(to everyone but Schumer and his then chief counsel, Preet Bharara) 
testimony from former Deputy Attorney General James Comey.  Comey 
recounted a story that had taken place when he was serving as acting attorney 
general during Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 2004 convalescence from 
gallbladder surgery.  White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Chief of 
Staff Andy Card went to Ashcroft’s hospital room to try to pressure him to 
sign off on reauthorizing a wiretapping program that Comey had refused to 
support.243  Ashcroft refused, and the next day the White House renewed the 
program against the Department of Justice’s advice.  After Ashcroft, Comey, 
and several other DOJ officials (including FBI Director Robert Mueller) 
threatened to resign, the White House backed down and restructured the 
program.244  Although the broad outlines of that story had been previously 
published, Comey’s was the first public eyewitness account.245  Six years 
later, The Washington Post’s senior congressional correspondent recalled 
that, during Comey’s testimony, “[y]ou could hear a pin drop in the Dirksen 
hearing room, and in fact we did, when one reporter—stunned at what he was 
hearing—literally just dropped his pen onto the press table.”246  The 
testimony had the effect of reviving the flagging congressional investigations 
into the politically motivated firing of a number of U.S. attorneys,247 and 
Alberto Gonzales, who had by then become attorney general, resigned a little 
over three months later.248  Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) said publicly that 
Comey’s testimony marked the moment that he believed Gonzales had to 
resign,249 and a large number of news stories on Gonzales’s resignation 
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prominently mentioned the testimony.250  To be sure, Comey’s testimony had 
added some new facts to the public record.  But far more importantly, it gave 
those facts a face and a voice.  And by not telegraphing the contents of the 
testimony in advance, Schumer and Bharara managed to orchestrate that 
most attention-grabbing of dramatic devices, the sudden plot twist.  Making 
the revelation in real time, to an unexpecting audience, almost certainly 
heightened the breathlessness and drama with which Comey’s testimony was 
reported in the media.  Indeed, The Washington Post’s media critic described 
the sickbed scene as something “right out of a Hollywood movie.”251  Nor 
was he the only one to reach for the metaphor of the cinema252 or the stage.253  
Readers and viewers at home were invited to be riveted in precisely the way 
that the few pen-dropping reporters in physical attendance had been.  And 
that dramatic pacing had real consequences for Gonzales and for the George 
W. Bush administration more generally.254 
Overspeech is thus shot through with performative elements, ranging from 
casting to scripting, from scenery to costuming, all of it aimed at more 
effectively communicating a public message. 
C.  Divisiveness 
A third and final distinguishing feature of overspeech is its divisiveness.  
This can mean that it tends to divide along partisan lines or ideological ones.  
(The link between partisanship and ideology has, of course, changed 
significantly over time.)255 
On the consensus view, divisiveness is something to be deeply lamented.  
This makes a certain amount of sense on its own premises:  If the goal is 
simply the discovery of facts and if everyone is engaging in good faith, then 
the investigators should not divide along preexisting lines.  Of course, 
sophisticated proponents of the consensus view are not unaware that 
cognitive biases will color how people receive and process facts and that 
those biases will correlate with their partisan and ideological leanings.  But 
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those preexisting commitments should be understood in precisely that way:  
as potential sources of bias, to be cabined as effectively as possible in the 
investigatory process.  It shouldn’t matter whether the police officer 
investigating a homicide is a Republican or a Democrat, a liberal or a 
conservative; nor, on the consensus view, should it matter whether the 
member of Congress investigating accusations of executive branch 
malfeasance is.  So thoroughly ingrained is this idea of consensus in the 
consensus view that one of the four criteria Levin and Bean propose for 
oversight effectiveness is simply “the extent to which the investigation was 
conducted in a bipartisan manner.”256 
This consensus view rests on the idea that oversight can be divorced from 
politics.  Expressing this view, Neal Katyal criticized congressional 
Democrats for 
myopically view[ing] the [Mueller] report in political terms . . . .  That is 
the wrong way to look at it.  The right way is to look at it in law enforcement 
terms—a president who takes grave steps to undermine the rule of law in 
the very way the report describes is not fit for office.257 
But note that Katyal has smuggled an irreducibly political consideration—
fitness for office—into what he insists is an apolitical realm.258  Insisting that 
the (political) position one holds is apolitical, natural, simply flowing from 
the facts themselves, can often be an effective form of political script writing, 
but an analysis of such claims should not simply take them at face value. 
Thinking instead in terms of the interactions between institutionally sited 
actors and their publics gives us a window onto the divisive uses of 
congressional overspeech.  In some cases, the goal of the overspeech may be 
to appeal to only part of the population, trying to move it in a particular 
direction—perhaps with the expectation that the rest of the public can be 
moved in time.  Consider again the Mueller testimony:  early polling showed 
that it had no measurable impact on overall support for impeaching President 
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Trump.259  However, this is not because it failed to move voters—it simply 
further polarized the electorate.  Nearly half of Democrats said the hearings 
made them more supportive of impeachment, while fewer than 10 percent 
said it made them less supportive.260  This was counterbalanced by a shift of 
similar magnitude, but in the opposite direction, among Republicans, with 
roughly equal numbers of independents saying that it made them more and 
less supportive of impeachment.261  If one thinks the Democrats’ goal in 
staging the Mueller hearings was to immediately move the views of the 
public at large, then the hearings were a bust.  However, if one thinks of them 
as one part of a larger communicative strategy—one act in the dramatic 
performance—then the outcome is not so clear.  Prior to Mueller’s testimony, 
eighty-six Democratic members of the House had come out in favor of 
opening an impeachment inquiry into Trump (37 percent of the House 
Democratic caucus).262  By the end of the week of Mueller’s testimony, that 
number had grown to ninety-nine,263 and in less than a month it had grown 
to 123 (52 percent of the caucus).264  (No Republicans publicly supported 
opening an impeachment inquiry, while one independent—former 
Republican Justin Amash of Michigan—supported it.)  Importantly, the 
immediate aftermath of the Mueller testimony also saw the highest-ranking 
Democrat to that point, caucus vice chair Representative Katherine Clark (D-
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MA), publicly announce support for an impeachment inquiry.265  Within a 
couple of weeks, Judiciary Committee Chair Jerry Nadler (D-NY) began 
publicly characterizing his committee’s ongoing investigation as “formal 
impeachment proceedings,”266 and in less than two months, the committee 
approved (on a party-line vote) a resolution establishing procedures to govern 
“the Committee’s investigation to determine whether to recommend articles 
of impeachment with respect to President Donald J. Trump.”267  One should 
be careful not to attribute all of those shifts directly to the Mueller testimony, 
but it is clear that it had an impact on the Democratic segment of the public 
that, in turn, paved the way for—or in some cases, pushed toward—more 
aggressive support for impeachment among congressional Democrats.  These 
developments set the stage for the subsequent revelations of presidential 
misconduct,268 which convinced enough additional Democrats to support 
impeachment that Speaker Pelosi threw the weight of party leadership behind 
it in late September 2019,269 and the cameral resolution structuring the 
impeachment inquiry passed by a vote of 232 to 196:  all but two Democrats 
voted for it (as did independent Justin Amash), and all Republicans voted 
against it.270 
And once such proceedings are underway, they hold the possibility—
although by no means the certainty271—of moving the public at large.  How 
do we know?  Because it has happened before.  In June of 1973, only 19 
percent of Americans thought President Nixon should be impeached, 
including only 6 percent of Republicans.272  By early August of 1974—mere 
days before his resignation—support for Nixon’s removal from office273 had 
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reached 58 percent of adults, including 31 percent of Republicans.274  (Over 
the same time, support for impeachment/removal among independents rose 
from 18 percent to 55 percent and among Democrats from 27 percent to 71 
percent.)275  As historian Julian Zelizer noted, two of the events that seem to 
have precipitated significant pro-impeachment/removal shifts in public 
opinion were the beginning of House Judiciary Committee impeachment 
hearings in May 1974 and the reporting out of articles of impeachment in 
July 1974:  “This wasn’t Congress waiting on the public . . . .  It was the other 
way around—Congress provided guidance to the public.”276  Moreover, the 
shift in public opinion seems at least to have been correlated with a shift in 
some members’ voting.  In October 1973, the first votes in the House 
Judiciary Committee on matters related to impeachment—votes on 
procedural matters about how the subpoena power would be exercised in the 
course of the investigation—were straight party-line votes.277  Nine months 
later, six of the committee’s seventeen Republicans voted for the first article 
of impeachment, alleging obstruction of justice in connection with the cover-
up of the Watergate break-in and other illegal activities.278  Two things are 
worth noting here.  First, partisanship was still hugely important in the 
Judiciary Committee votes:  every Democrat on the committee voted to 
impeach, and only about a third of Republicans did.  But second, what started 
as an almost purely partisan issue—almost no Republicans in the public at 
large supported impeachment, and the earliest Judiciary Committee votes 
were straight party-line—became something else over time.  Overspeech that 
began as partisan managed to persuade a significant number of members of 
the other party. 
In addition to affecting the behavior of elected officials, the public politics 
shaped in part by the overspeech surrounding Watergate also had electoral 
ramifications.  The 1974 midterm elections were a landslide for the 
Democrats, who gained a net of fifty House seats.  The new Ninety-Fourth 
Congress included seventy-six freshman Democrats who would become the 
vaunted “Class of ‘74”—frequently referred to as the “Watergate babies.”279  
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Partisan congressional overspeech may thus have the effect of convincing 
more of the public to become the overspeakers’ co-partisans (and/or of 
increasing electoral turnout among those who already are). 
In short, thinking in terms of overspeech helps us see that there are a 
number of public-facing goals that may very effectively be pursued through 
proceedings that divide along partisan or ideological lines. 
III.  CASE STUDIES 
This Article has already discussed a number of recent examples of 
congressional overspeech, ranging from the Mueller hearings to Comey’s 
testimony about the hospital-bed meeting to Ocasio-Cortez’s testimony about 
migrant detention facilities.  These most recent instances of overspeech have 
been disseminated to their audiences by twenty-first-century technologies of 
communication, prominently including the internet.  But while effective 
overspeech is necessarily calibrated to take advantage of the media of the 
day, it is by no means a new phenomenon, as the following two case studies 
from earlier media environments will demonstrate. 
It should also be noted that these case studies will not strike readers as 
uniformly ennobling.  That, too, was part of the logic behind their selection.  
Just as a hammer can be used to build a bookcase or commit an assault, so 
too the tool of congressional overspeech can be used for purposes that we 
come to see in retrospect as both good and bad.  The goal here is not to 
convince the reader of the normative valence of the goals pursued by various 
overspeakers but rather to give two thick accounts of overspeech in practice, 
demonstrating the ways in which it empowers congressional actors. 
A.  The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934–1936 
On February 8, 1934, Senator Gerald Nye, a progressive Republican from 
North Dakota, introduced a resolution calling on the Foreign Relations 
Committee to “investigate the activities of individuals and of corporations in 
the United States engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, import, or 
export of arms, munitions, or other implements of war.”280  The resolution 
was the brainchild of peace activist Dorothy Detzer, and she and Nye drafted 
it together.281  Detzer and Nye were both capitalizing on and furthering a 
surge of interest in the “merchants of death” thesis, which held that American 
munitions manufacturers had played a significant role in pressing for 
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American entry into World War I.  The month after Nye introduced his 
resolution, Fortune magazine—which generally took a conservative, pro-
business line—published a lengthy exposé of the European armaments 
industry (broadly construed to include “mines, smelters, armament works, 
holding companies, and banks”), accusing it of “working inevitably for the 
destruction of such little internationalism as the world has achieved so 
far.”282  Reader’s Digest, then the most widely read magazine in America, 
excerpted the article two months later.283  In the same year, two books were 
published on the topic, one of which (Helmuth C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. 
Hanighen’s Merchants of Death:  A Study of the International Armament 
Industry) was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection.284  This large-scale 
revival of interest in how America got into World War I would come to have 
significant consequences for the terms on which it entered the next World 
War—and the congressional overspeech touched off by Detzer and Nye’s 
resolution would play a significant role in the process. 
The chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Key Pittman (D-
NV), wanted little to do with Nye’s resolution when it was referred to his 
committee, and he transferred it to the Military Affairs Committee.  Detzer 
and her allies in the peace movement were alarmed by this, seeing the 
Military Affairs Committee as “predominantly and vigorously military 
minded.”285  They accordingly worked out a two-pronged plan.  First, they 
would seek to combine Nye’s resolution with one by his fellow Republican 
Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan.  The Vandenberg resolution, which was 
backed by the American Legion and had also been referred to the Military 
Affairs Committee, called for both an investigation of the findings of the War 
Policies Commission, which had been created to “take the profit out of war,” 
and also an inquiry into the possibility of creating a government monopoly 
on munitions manufacturing.286  Combining Nye’s resolution with 
Vandenberg’s would ensure “a double-barreled support from two 
diametrically opposed wings of public opinion—the peace movement and the 
Legion.”287  Second, Detzer sought to secure a more congenial venue for the 
hearings:  she proposed that, rather than have either the Foreign Relations 
Committee or the Military Affairs Committee conduct the investigation, a 
special committee be impaneled to do so.288  The ultimate resolution, 
cosponsored by Nye and Vandenberg and reported out favorably by the 
Military Affairs Committee, combined their proposals and called for the 
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creation of a seven-member select committee, appointed by the vice 
president, to investigate the munitions industry and the role of profit in war-
making.289 
The Roosevelt administration announced support for the investigation, at 
least partly because it anticipated that the committee would generate negative 
publicity for a number of industrialists who were staunch New Deal 
opponents.  It also assumed that the special committee would be chaired by 
Morris Sheppard, a Democrat from Texas and member of the Military Affairs 
Committee.290  When the measure came to the floor, Nye, Vandenberg, and 
several other pacifist senators effectively began a filibuster, speaking in favor 
of pacifist measures and thereby holding up the passage of a revenue bill.  
Finally, Pat Harrison (D-MS), the chairman of the Finance Committee, 
agreed to support the immediate adoption of the Nye-Vandenberg resolution 
in exchange for a chance to vote on the revenue bill.  The resolution 
accordingly passed without a recorded vote and with no senator voicing 
opposition.291 
Vice President John Nance Garner asked Nye and Vandenberg to suggest 
four Democrats and three Republicans to make up the committee, and he 
accepted their recommendations (which included themselves).292  Crucially, 
Garner also allowed the committee to select its own chair, presumably on the 
impression that one of the majority Democrats would be chosen.  Instead, the 
committee unanimously chose Nye.293  Secretary of State Cordell Hull was 
outraged by the choice—even in his memoirs, written over a decade later, the 
sense of frustration that this “isolationist of the deepest dye” was chosen 
comes through clearly.294  He described it as a “blunder of major 
proportions” and insisted that, “[h]ad I dreamed that an isolationist 
Republican would be appointed I promptly would have opposed it, but I 
expected that a member of the majority party would be named under the usual 
practice and that he would keep the investigation within legitimate and 
reasonable bounds . . . .”295 
At Detzer’s suggestion, Nye hired Stephen Raushenbush as chief 
investigator.296  Raushenbush was the son of a prominent Social Gospel 
minister and was himself inclined to believe the “merchants of death” 
thesis.297  (The staff that Raushenbush assembled briefly included Alger 
Hiss, on loan from Jerome Frank’s staff at the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration.)298  As the behind-the-scenes investigation ramped up in the 
summer of 1934, major players already began taking their cases to the press.  
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The New York Times reprinted excerpts from a letter in which Irénée du Pont, 
the former president and then vice chairman of the board of DuPont, the 
largest munitions manufacturer in the United States, insisted that the attack 
on armaments manufacturers was led by a “subservient force instigated by 
the Third International and allied interests to weaken the defensive powers 
of capitalistic countries.”299  A few weeks later, Nye told the Times that 
munitions makers were trying to sabotage the investigation, but it would not 
only proceed as planned, it would reveal “startling facts” to the American 
public.300  Roosevelt was thrilled with the discomfort being caused the du 
Ponts, who were among the founders and chief funders of the American 
Liberty League, a conservative anti–New Deal group.301  So pleased was 
FDR with Nye’s investigation that, when the president made a campaign 
swing through North Dakota in August 1934, he invited the Republican Nye 
to introduce him and Eleanor Roosevelt before a crowd of 35,000 people.302 
Even before they opened, the Nye committee hearings were getting 
breathless previews in the press.  A multipage spread in The Washington Post 
began, “What promises to be the most comprehensive and revealing inquiry 
ever conducted into the business of making and selling death-dealing 
machines and implements—and, also, one of the Senate’s most sensational 
investigations—will get underway this week . . . .”303  The Post noted that 
such industrial titans as the du Pont family and John Pierpont Morgan were 
expected to be witnesses and that a “shadowy” European arms dealer named 
Sir Basil Zaharoff would feature in the inquiry as well.304  With advance 
billing like that, it is perhaps unsurprising that, when the hearings opened 
later that week, NBC radio microphones were prominently arrayed on the 
witness table.305  The committee from the beginning made use of props to 
send a message both about the thoroughness of its investigation and about 
the import of what was uncovered:  the Times report on the first day of the 
hearings noted that “[s]cores of letters and other documents taken from the 
files of [munitions manufacturers] were piled high on the big table behind 
which . . . members of the committee sat.  These were said by Senator Nye 
to be ‘only samples’ of what is to follow in the weeks ahead.”306  The 
committee also clearly understood that it had a compelling figure in Zaharoff, 
who seems to have served as a middleman for deals between American 
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munitions makers and European clients.  The leading historical account of 
the Munitions Inquiry mentions Zaharoff on only a single page,307 but the 
press at the time couldn’t get enough of the octogenarian polyglot “man of 
mystery” who “looks like Cardinal Richelieu” and whose national 
allegiances appeared to be both indeterminate and constantly in flux.308  The 
Times devoted a substantial percentage of its lengthy write-up of the first day 
of the hearings to Zaharoff, including reprinting his photograph and two 
letters by him that had been introduced into evidence.309  Nor was the Times 
an outlier in its Zaharoff mania:310  the committee had found a vivid character 
to help focus public attention on its work. 
A big part of the committee’s task in the subsequent months would be to 
take the public interest generated by a singular compelling character and turn 
it into interest in the committee’s project as a whole.  Nye was well-suited to 
the task:  before entering politics, he had spent fifteen years as a newspaper 
editor (which was also his father’s career),311 on top of which he had a 
reputation as “an unusually effective [public] speaker.”312  He was thus well-
suited to both direct and perform in the committee’s overspeech.  The 
sensational hits were to keep coming in the hearings’ early days, as members 
of the du Pont family testified,313 and King George V was named—much to 
London’s dismay—as a promoter of British arms sales abroad.314  As the 
correspondent for The Christian Century noted, the press corps turned out 
and remained out in full force, sending “up-to-the-minute” dispatches by 
telegraph back to their outlets.315  At the conclusion of the first set of 
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hearings, The New Republic wrote that, “[i]n this generation, there has been 
nothing else like the Senate munitions inquiry.  Here are people talking in 
public, for the first time, about international affairs as they are.”316  The 
veracity of that claim was open to debate—Secretary of State Hull, for one, 
decried the hearings as “propaganda” and claimed that they “gave the 
American people a wholly erroneous view as to the reasons why we had gone 
to war in 1917.”317  But as both The New Republic and Hull had to 
acknowledge, the hearings were affecting the American people.  For the 
former, it was the embodied nature of the testimony that was most 
compelling:  “Here they sit, in the flesh, the merchants of death.”318  The 
Christian Century, too, focused on the physical appearance of the munitions 
executives: 
From reading the stories one expects to meet a cordon of rampant jingoists, 
breathing blood and thunder, veritable Wotans of might and power who 
hold nations within their grasp and start wars on a moment’s notice.  One 
is disturbed when one sees instead men who could pass the plate at any 
church service without anyone looking at them twice.319 
After the first set of hearings wrapped up, Nye and Raushenbush consulted 
on how they might maintain public interest.  One set of strategies involved 
enlisting allies:  the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(of which Detzer was the executive secretary) “used the committee’s findings 
to mobilize peace-minded voters.”320  Another set of strategies involved 
taking advantage of Nye’s own oratorical abilities:  his announcement of an 
extensive speaking tour in the fall of 1934 (including a national radio 
address) was itself covered in the press.321 
When the hearings resumed in December, the du Ponts were back in the 
hot seats.322  The committee produced evidence of the outsized profits that 
many American corporations and individuals had made during the First 
World War,323 evidence that both grabbed headlines and prompted a 
vigorous response from the du Pont family.324  At the same time, the Times 
reported that the hearings had “exciting moments” when munitions company 
executives were presented with correspondence from their own files and 
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asked to explain it.325  The overall impression produced by the hearings was 
a sense that, even if the munitions makers had not deliberately maneuvered 
the nation into World War I, at least “money and profit dominated their 
thinking about war.”326 
Around the same time, the focus of the inquiry began to broaden to include 
not simply the munitions manufacturers and their surrounding private 
infrastructure but also American government officials who had industry 
ties.327  In other words, the committee began groping its way toward 
identifying what would later be termed the military-industrial complex.328  
(One can see this in The Christian Century’s account of the first round of 
hearings, which, after noting the shockingly ordinary appearance of the 
munitions makers,329 pivoted to claiming that their very ordinariness 
demonstrated the need for deeper structural reform of both capitalism and the 
political economy of war.)330  This turn made the committee’s work less 
hospitable to the Roosevelt administration than when it was simply going 
after industrialist opponents of the New Deal.331  FDR accordingly tried to 
co-opt the committee’s work by naming an executive-branch-based 
commission to inquire into taking the profit out of war.332  This new 
commission was to be chaired by Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch, 
whose conclusions were almost certain to be less sweeping than Nye’s.333  
Nye and Vandenberg immediately went public, chastising the president for 
attempting to undermine the congressional committee’s work.334  Nye 
quipped to the press that, “[w]hen I view, in part, the personnel of the [Baruch 
commission], I cannot but think how unfortunate it is that [notorious gangster 
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John] Dillinger is dead.  He was the logical person to write anti-crime 
laws.”335  Nye’s allies in the press likewise recognized and decried 
Roosevelt’s gambit as an attempt to sideline the Senate investigation.  The 
Nation, noting the “startling disclosures” made by the Nye committee, 
insisted that “[i]f public opinion has been even partially awakened to the 
menace of the arms traffic, the credit belongs almost exclusively to Senator 
Nye and his committee.”336  The Baruch investigation, it argued, was a 
wholly inadequate substitute.337  The committee continued its work with the 
Senate’s support:  a month after Roosevelt announced the Baruch 
commission, the Senate appropriated an additional $50,000 for the Nye 
committee,338 and the Nye committee published a preliminary report and its 
first full report in the spring and early summer of 1935.339  As its split with 
the administration developed, Roosevelt increasingly publicly branded the 
committee as “isolationist”340 and privately fumed that it was intended to 
embarrass his administration.341 
“Isolationist” was a loaded term, but the broader fight in American foreign 
policy was over whether the United States would remain neutral in what 
seemed to be the increasingly likely event of another large-scale international 
conflagration.342  In this dispute, the Nye committee was slowly helping pro-
neutrality forces gain the upper hand against opposition from the Roosevelt 
administration, which wanted to maintain freedom to set its own, 
significantly more internationalist, course.  Although neutrality remained 
within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, Nye and the other 
members of his committee were among its leading proponents.  In April and 
May 1935, Nye and his committee colleague Bennett Clark (D-MO) 
introduced or cosponsored four resolutions on various aspects of neutrality 
(including, inter alia, withholding passports from Americans traveling in war 
zones or on belligerent ships, prohibiting private loans and credit to 
belligerents, and prohibiting the export of all American armaments to 
belligerents).343  The Roosevelt administration lobbied the Foreign Relations 
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Committee against these proposals, offering instead its own alternative that 
would give the president discretion to decide whether (and to whom) to 
prohibit arms shipments.344  The Foreign Relations Committee reported out 
a “compromise” resolution that was, in fact, significantly closer to the various 
Nye-Clark versions than to the administration’s version.345  As one historian 
has noted, the compromise “resolution was intended partly to appease public 
opinion on the issue but probably both [Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman] Pittman and the administration hoped Congress would adjourn 
without adopting it.”346  Nye and his colleagues filibustered to ensure that 
would not happen, and eventually the resolution passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent.  The House almost immediately passed it as well—but 
added an administration sponsored amendment that sunset the arms embargo 
provisions in six months.  Nye reluctantly signed on to the amendment, and 
the bill went to FDR, who reluctantly signed it, fearing that he could not win 
a battle with Congress over the issue.347  The New York Times’s Arthur Krock 
noted that Nye and his colleagues “did not get all of [what they wanted], but 
they got a good deal” and that the end result “tie[d] the hands of the executive 
department.”348  Secretary of State Hull was furious:  “[t]he Nye Committee 
hearings furnished the isolationist springboard for the first Neutrality Act” 
by “arous[ing] an isolationist sentiment that was to tie the hands of the 
Administration . . . .  [i]t confused the minds of our own people.”349  Hull 
would have preferred no neutrality legislation at all,350 but with “[p]ublic 
opinion . . . swayed . . . by the spectacular conclusions of the Nye 
Committee,” as well as the specter of impending war, “it was now evident 
that the movement in Congress, spurred by isolationist agitation, was too 
strong.”351  At least on the view of Hull and other administration allies, then, 
the Nye committee had moved public opinion, which in turn had shaped 
congressional views, to such an extent that the president was essentially 
forced to sign legislation tying his own hands.352 
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Meanwhile, the committee was continuing to hold hearings, including 
asking Baruch to testify about the administration’s position on wartime 
profiteering and then—in a move that it is hard to see as anything other than 
payback for the Baruch commission—demanding his tax returns and 
information about his investments to see if he had any conflicts of interest.353  
Beginning in January 1936, Nye began simultaneously pushing for new, 
permanent neutrality legislation and presiding over hearings probing the 
wartime role of Wall Street bankers.354  The public was especially interested 
in John Pierpont Morgan’s testimony:  the hearings were moved to a larger 
room to accommodate the demand for seats,355 but even so, “[s]cores of 
latecomers were turned back by the doorkeepers.”356  Competing props were 
used to demonstrate both the committee’s and the bankers’ seriousness:  the 
committee had before it “more than 2,000,000 cablegrams, telegrams, letters 
and other documents,”357 while Morgan and his associates brought “more 
than fifty giant-sized ledgers . . . for reference.”358  Morgan attempted to 
steer the hearings toward his preferred narrative with a lengthy opening 
statement—which the Times reprinted in full—but was “stunned” when 
Senator Clark accused him of reading a “stump speech” and said that it would 
not be allowed to happen again.359  The Times’s report on the first day of 
Morgan’s testimony began on the front page and then took the entirety of 
another page.360  The story previewing his testimony from the previous day’s 
paper ended by noting that Nye and Clark had just introduced a new 
neutrality bill.361  Time magazine made the same connection, but rather more 
disdainfully, noting that “Nye, Clark and other members of the Congressional 
peace-by-isolation bloc . . . planned to bring the nation’s peace passion once 
more to white heat and whoop Neutrality through Congress by haling J.P. 
Morgan & Co. before their Senate Munitions Investigating Committee.”362 
Once again, Nye and his colleagues’ show was effective.  The following 
month, Roosevelt signed the 1936 Neutrality Act,363 which extended the 
mandatory embargo on arms sales to belligerents until May 1937 and banned 
loans to belligerents.364  In other words, it extended the feature of the 1935 
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Act that FDR most disliked—the nondiscretionary arms embargo—and it 
added to it a nondiscretionary ban on loans.  As the Times noted, the 1936 
Act, like its predecessor, was a compromise: 
No secret has been made of the fact that the new act is mutually 
unsatisfactory alike to the President and other groups.  Mr. Roosevelt would 
like wider discretion given the President in administering the embargo 
provisions, while the extremist peace advocates have served notice they 
would continue work for a law that would lay down a blanket embargo 
against any and all belligerent countries.365 
But once again, while neither side got everything it wanted, Nye and Clark 
came away having substantially limited the president’s options.366 
Right around the time that Nye and his allies were winning their second 
Neutrality Act battle, the committee was also sowing the seeds of its own 
precipitous downfall.  On January 15, 1936, Clark introduced evidence into 
the committee record that President Woodrow Wilson (at this point, deceased 
for over a decade) had known by 1917 of the existence of “secret treaties” 
between Britain, France, and Russia creating postwar spheres of influence in 
the eastern Mediterranean.  Wilson had denied that he knew of the treaties 
before the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.367  After hearing Clark’s evidence, 
Nye remarked that “both the President and Secretary [of State Robert] 
Lansing falsified concerning this matter.”368  The reaction was explosive, 
with Nye’s charge that Wilson had “falsified” leading nearly every major 
newspaper.369  The reaction by a number of Democratic senators to the attack 
on Wilson was swift.  Most dramatically, Senator Carter Glass (D-VA), who 
had been Wilson’s secretary of the treasury, took to the Senate floor and 
“opened wide his noteworthy vocabulary.”370  In remarks that were reprinted 
in their entirety in the Times, Glass thundered: 
If it were permissible in the Senate to say that any man who would asperse 
the integrity and veracity of Woodrow Wilson is a coward, if it were 
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permissible to say that his charge is not only malicious but positively 
mendacious, that I would be glad to say [it] here and elsewhere . . . .371 
In the course of his speech, Glass pounded the desk with such force that his 
knuckles began to bleed, a fact that was breathlessly reported.372 
The committee never recovered from the backlash to its attack on Wilson.  
It held eight more days of hearings, focused on “less sensational topics . . . 
that produced no confrontational episodes.”373  In June of 1936, it released 
its final reports (seven in all)374 and wrapped up its business.  But even so, 
the committee continued to exert significant influence.  Between July and 
December of 1936, Nye went on a thirty-eight-state speaking tour advocating 
neutrality, emphasizing many of the same themes the committee had 
emphasized.375  In January 1937, he gave a nationwide radio broadcast on 
the topic.376  And on May 1 of that year, Roosevelt signed the Neutrality Act 
of 1937,377 which made permanent the mandatory embargoes on both 
armaments and loans to belligerents, as well as the ban on travel by 
Americans on belligerent ships.  It also gave the president two-year 
discretionary authority to require “cash-and-carry” for the sale of non-
embargoed goods to belligerents.378 
Nye himself voted against the conference report on the 1937 Act, on the 
grounds that it did not go far enough.379  But in his 1944 valedictory address, 
having lost his reelection campaign, Nye claimed the Neutrality Acts as the 
great success of the Senate Munitions Committee investigation.380  For Nye, 
even though the Neutrality Acts were ultimately repealed (and “sabotaged” 
by the White House before that), they nevertheless succeeded in keeping the 
United States out of World War II “for more than 2 years,” despite powerful 
forces, including within the Roosevelt administration, doing their best to drag 
the country into the war.381  Secretary of State Hull, as we have seen, agreed 
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with Nye’s descriptive claim,382 as have historians of the period.383  Of 
course, historians have also agreed with Nye that Roosevelt’s compliance 
with the Acts was only partial.384  Nevertheless, there is widespread 
agreement that the isolationist bloc in Congress hemmed Roosevelt in and 
that the Nye committee served as a focal point for that bloc. 
Moreover, the way in which the committee served as a focal point was by 
making use of overspeech.  The newspaper editor turned Senator Nye 
ensured from the beginning that the hearings would be communicative, going 
out of his way to cultivate newspaper and radio coverage throughout the 
committee’s lifespan.  He made compelling use of actors, whether by 
invoking distant and mysterious figures like Sir Basil Zaharoff or by haling 
in and grilling commercial titans like the du Ponts or J. P. Morgan.  When a 
witness like Morgan attempted to seize control of the hearings’ script, the 
members of the committee quickly insisted on reasserting control.  The 
members even used props, as when they piled up documents on the hearing 
room tables to convey a sense of overwhelming evidence.  Moreover, the 
hearings were deeply divisive, although in ways that cut across party lines.  
In particular, by helping to deepen preexisting cleavages between 
internationalists and isolationists, the hearings sharpened the terms of the 
debate and helped push more Americans into the latter camp.  And the 
cumulative effect of all of this was a change in the public mood, one that—
as even Secretary Hull realized much to his chagrin—filtered back to 
Congress and required FDR to deal with the isolationist bloc, ultimately by 
agreeing to a series of Neutrality Acts that were far more constraining than 
he would have liked. 
B.  McCarthy and the Army-McCarthy Hearings, 1950–1954 
Alger Hiss, who had played a small role in the Nye committee,385 was to 
play a somewhat larger one in the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) 
as a national force.  In the aftermath of the allied victory in World War II, the 
advent of the Cold War brought with it the Second Red Scare, the hunt for 
Communist infiltration into American government and society that was, for 
a time, synonymous with McCarthy’s name.  Hiss, who in 1946 had become 
president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was identified 
as a Communist by Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities in 1948.  Chambers subsequently produced evidence 
that, not only had Hiss been a Communist, he had also spied for the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s.  Hiss’s subsequent denials before a federal grand jury 
led to his indictment for perjury, the statute of limitations on espionage 
having run.  After a hung jury in his first trial, he was convicted in January 
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1950.386  The previous year, the Soviets had successfully tested an atomic 
bomb for the first time, and the Communists had taken over China.  To an 
American public trying to figure out how the Cold War could be going so 
awry, espionage seemed like an obvious answer, and revelations of espionage 
by Hiss—and, in 1950, by Klaus Fuchs, Julius Rosenberg, and others—
provided enough evidence to make the thesis compelling.  In the years to 
come, McCarthy would make repeated use of overspeech, in both effective 
and ineffective ways, to put his version of this thesis before the American 
people.  In the end, it would also be the effective use of overspeech by his 
opponents that would bring his career crashing down. 
Just over two weeks after Hiss’s conviction, McCarthy, a freshman 
Republican senator, was set to give a speech to the Ohio County Women’s 
Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia.  He was not new to Red-
baiting—it had been a significant component of his 1946 campaign387—but 
he also was not yet particularly known for it.  The Wheeling speech would 
change that.  It was there that he infamously held up a piece of paper and 
claimed to have a list of 205 “members of the Communist Party and members 
of a spy ring” working in the State Department.388  The exact numbers 
changed over his next few speeches, but McCarthy’s press savviness389 
meant that the charges got increasing attention in subsequent days.  Two days 
after the Wheeling speech, the New York Times ran an article on McCarthy’s 
claims.390  The extent of McCarthy’s success in driving the national 
conversation was evident two days later when the Times carried another story 
noting that the State Department had asked McCarthy to release the names 
of the alleged subversives.391  Five days after that, a Times headline read, 
“Broader Loyalty Tests Proposed for U.S. Jobs,” crediting McCarthy’s 
allegations with “reviv[ing] some discussion in Washington” about 
broadening the scope of loyalty investigations.392 
Eleven days after the Wheeling speech, McCarthy took to the Senate floor 
for nearly eight hours to speak on the dangers of Communist infiltration of 
the State Department.  Again, the media paid attention, with the speech 
making the front page of The Washington Post.393  Indeed, the floor speech 
was enough to draw the attention of the Times’s editorial board, which wrote 
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that McCarthy “has been giving a good imitation of a hit-and-run driver” by 
engaging in a “campaign of indiscriminate character-assassination.”394  But 
by this point it was impossible to ignore McCarthy’s charges or brush them 
aside.  His overspeech pushed Senate leadership—which was then controlled 
by the Democrats—to impanel a special subcommittee (albeit one packed 
with Truman administration loyalists) to look into Communist subversion in 
the State Department.395  The subcommittee was chaired by Millard Tydings 
(D-MD);396 McCarthy participated as a witness, rather than as a member of 
the subcommittee. 
The first meeting of the Tydings committee was standing-room-only,397 
and McCarthy’s accusation that Dorothy Kenyon, a former U.S. delegate to 
the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, was affiliated with 
a number of Communist front organizations received multiple columns 
above the fold in the next day’s Times and Post.398  The most sustained target 
of McCarthy’s attack was Owen Lattimore, an Asia specialist at Johns 
Hopkins and sometime outside adviser to the State Department,399 whom 
McCarthy described to the committee as “the top Russian agent” and Hiss’s 
“boss.”400  When Lattimore appeared before the Tydings committee—
represented by Abe Fortas—the room was “packed to capacity.”401  
Lattimore’s performance before the committee was effective, both defending 
himself and attacking McCarthy’s methods.402  Time magazine noted 
approvingly that he “spoke with the smooth assurance of the experienced 
lecturer and he had the crowd with him.”403  Four members of the 
subcommittee, including one Republican, all announced that they had looked 
at Lattimore’s FBI file and found nothing in it to substantiate McCarthy’s 
charge.404  But McCarthy had another card to play:  a prominent ex-
Communist of questionable truthfulness named Louis Budenz testified that 
Lattimore was a member of a Communist cell.405  McCarthy had sufficiently 
hyped Budenz’s testimony406 that the hearing room’s gallery was again 
packed.407  Suddenly, Time was not so sure:  Budenz was “a man whose 
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testimony could not lightly be dismissed . . . .  And so the matter stood:  
Owen Lattimore had not been proved a Communist, but he had not proved 
that he was not one.”408  Nor was Time alone:  the New York Times led with 
Budenz’s accusations on the front page, continuing across all of page two,409 
and The Washington Post’s coverage was equally expansive.410  Indeed, the 
favorable publicity from the Budenz testimony was largely “responsible for 
keeping [McCarthy] in business.”411 
In July 1950, the Tydings committee produced its report,412 which was 
almost entirely hostile to McCarthy.  It flatly concluded that his accusations 
of disloyalty in the State Department were “false” and “irresponsible” and 
that they constituted a “fraud and a hoax perpetrated on the Senate of the 
United States and the American people” and “perhaps the most nefarious 
campaign of half-truths and untruth in the history of this Republic.”413  Only 
the Democrats on the committee signed the report.414  The New Republic 
turned to the language of popular entertainment to describe the subsequent 
debate on the Senate floor:  it was “as good a show as we have ever 
watched.”415  Indeed, the magazine noted Senator Tydings’s use of both 
props and sound effects: 
Tydings had a five-foot pointer and eight big charts of blow-up quotations 
from McCarthy’s preposterous speeches.  These were put up in turn on a 
wooden frame for Senate inspection.  Carried away by fury, real or 
assumed, Tydings at one point put every ounce of energy into his arm and 
brought his ruler down “whack” on one offending quotation.  There was a 
crack like a pistol shot.  It seemed to this columnist that it wrote a 
punctuation point to a chapter of hysteria such as America has rarely 
known.416 
If Tydings’s gesture was a punctuation point, it was certainly not anything 
like a full stop.  The Senate voted to accept the Tydings committee’s report 
on a straight party-line vote, and media accounts too were divided along party 
lines.417  Both McCarthy and his antagonists had used overspeech to real, and 
divisive, effect. 
By the middle of 1950, McCarthy was a political celebrity, routinely 
gracing the covers of newsmagazines and the front pages of newspapers, and 
having contributed “McCarthyism” to the political vernacular.418  Polls 
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showed that significantly more Americans thought his charges were good for 
the country than thought they were harmful.419  And, although he was not up 
for reelection until 1952, he was in high demand on the campaign trail.420  
He spent a great deal of time in Maryland in particular, waging a successful 
underhanded campaign for Tydings’s opponent.421  Overall, Democrats 
maintained control of both congressional chambers, although Republicans 
gained a significant number of seats in each. 
The real shift would come two years later, when Republicans took control 
of both chambers of Congress and the presidency, and McCarthy himself was 
reelected.  It was “common knowledge” that President Dwight Eisenhower 
“despised” McCarthy,422 but he refrained from criticizing the senator by 
name on the campaign trail—a reticence that largely continued from the 
White House.  In the new Eighty-Second Congress, McCarthy was given the 
chairmanship of the Committee on Government Operations, from which the 
new majority leader, Robert Taft (R-OH), thought that McCarthy “can’t do 
any harm.”423  Taft was mistaken.  McCarthy appointed himself chair of the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and set out to make the most 
aggressive possible use of its expansive oversight powers.424  To help him 
out, he hired a number of staffers, including Roy Cohn as chief counsel and 
Robert F. Kennedy—whose father, Joseph, was a significant McCarthy 
donor—as assistant to the general counsel.425 
Over the next nine months, McCarthy’s subcommittee would hold 
hearings on alleged Communist subversion at the Voice of America, the 
Overseas Library Program, the Government Printing Office, and 
elsewhere.426  McCarthy was careful to stage-manage the hearings.  For 
example, the VOA hearings, in February and March 1953, were televised to 
an audience of “millions”427—but only after a week of closed hearings at 
which McCarthy screened witnesses and “chose some, friendly or otherwise, 
who he thought would most help his cause at open hearings before television 
cameras.”428  His subsequent hearings likewise generated significant media 
attention, even as they uncovered almost no new facts.429  McCarthy was 
engaged in classic overspeech, using the tools of oversight for primarily 
communicative and argumentative purposes.  This did not go over well with 
the three Democrats on the subcommittee:  in July 1953, in a dispute over 
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McCarthy’s high-handed management of the subcommittee’s staffing and 
procedures, they stormed out and began a boycott of subcommittee 
proceedings that would last more than six months.430  The result was to leave 
subcommittee proceedings entirely in McCarthy’s hands, without even the 
opportunity to engage in counter-overspeech. 
But in the fall of 1953, McCarthy made what would prove to be a serious 
miscalculation, when he went after the Army:  although initially successful 
in garnering attention, this line of inquiry would ultimately lead to his 
downfall.  McCarthy’s office had been receiving reports of Communist 
infiltration of the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, for 
months.  The Signal Corps was an important locus of cutting-edge military 
research and development and was therefore regarded as a highly sensitive 
site.431  In October, Roy Cohn got ahold of a list the FBI had compiled two 
years earlier of thirty-five “possible security risks” at Fort Monmouth.  He 
and McCarthy regarded the information as so potentially explosive that the 
senator cut short his honeymoon—a fact that was made much of in the 
press432—to fly to New York and begin several weeks of hearings at the 
Foley Square federal courthouse.  The location for the hearings made sense 
logistically; after all, if most of the witnesses were coming from northern 
New Jersey, then New York was a logical place to take their testimony.  But 
it was also a smart piece of political staging.  McCarthy worked mightily to 
connect the Monmouth “spy ring” to Julius Rosenberg, who had once worked 
there and had been executed for espionage in June 1953.433  Images of the 
Foley Square courthouse would, for many Americans, call to mind 
Rosenberg’s trial, which had been held in the same building.434  Moreover, 
McCarthy maintained very tight control over the public script coming out of 
the Fort Monmouth hearings:  for several weeks, the hearings were closed, 
with McCarthy then briefing reporters on what had happened.435  Press 
accounts dutifully relayed McCarthy’s version of what had transpired, often 
waiting several paragraphs to note that the testimony took place in 
“executive” or “closed” sessions.436  Unsurprisingly, the narrative coming 
 
 430. Id. at 321, 361. 
 431. Id. at 330–32. 
 432. See M’Carthy Returns for Army Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1953, at 9 (available 
through ProQuest Historical Newspapers). 
 433. See, e.g., Arthur Everett, McCarthy Names Rosenberg as ‘Brain’ of Radar Spy Ring, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1953, at 1 (available through ProQuest Historical Newspapers); Edward 
Ranzal, Rosenberg Called Radar Spy Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1953, at 1 (available 
through ProQuest Historical Newspapers). 
 434. The New York Herald Tribune made the connection explicit:  “Julius Rosenberg and 
his wife, Ethel, were arrested on July 17, 1950 and charged with war-time espionage for 
Russia.  After trial and conviction in the same court house where the subcommittee held its 
hearing they were sentenced to death . . . .” Walter Arm, Man, Linked to Rosenbergs, Is 
Recalled but Won’t Talk, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 1953, at 1 (available through ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers). 
 435. OSHINSKY, supra note 386, at 335. 
 436. See, e.g., Everett, supra note 433; Edward Ranzal, Army Radar Data Reported 
Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1953, at 1 (available through ProQuest Historical Newspapers); 
Ranzal, supra note 433; Red Scientists Got Secrets, M’Carthy Told, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 
2020] CONGRESSIONAL OVERSPEECH 587 
out of these closed sessions painted a dire picture of a Signal Corps rife with 
Communist subversion.  As an indication of how well McCarthy had sold the 
closed hearings, even the vehemently anti-McCarthyite Drew Pearson, in a 
column headlined “Pearson Agrees with McCarthy,” wrote that “Joe 
McCarthy will almost drop dead when he reads this, but in my opinion he is 
absolutely right in probing the leak of Signal Corps radar secrets at Fort 
Monmouth.”437 
But McCarthy also promised that there would be open hearings to come, 
so that the American people could see the problem for themselves.  Those 
hearings began in late November and, while they certainly had negative 
personal consequences for a number of the witnesses,438 they proved 
somewhat anticlimactic, as McCarthy could adduce no evidence of current 
subversive activities at Fort Monmouth.439  The hearings continued to make 
news, but while his reports of the closed Fort Monmouth hearings frequently 
got top billing, only twice in the six weeks after the public hearings began 
did they make the front page of the New York Times, and they never graced 
the front page of The Washington Post.440  The lack of sensational new 
revelations did not seem to hurt McCarthy’s standing with the broader public, 
however:  he and his hunt for Communist subversives continued to poll 
well.441 
In January 1954, Democrats returned to the subcommittee, having won a 
few concessions from McCarthy.  One of those concessions was the right to 
hire minority counsel—and they promptly hired Robert Kennedy, who had 
left McCarthy’s staff at the end of July 1953 to go into private practice.442  
Meanwhile, the committee continued to investigate the Army, including how 
individuals with Communist affiliations were allowed to remain in the 
service or be honorably discharged therefrom.  In February, in a closed 
session, McCarthy tore into General Ralph Zwicker, the commanding 
general at Camp Kilmer in New Jersey, saying that he was “not fit to wear 
that uniform.”443  Increasingly, the Army was convinced that it had to stop 
playing defense and hit McCarthy back.444  At about the same time, and 
spurred by the same causes, Republican congressional leadership was 
beginning at last to publicly express unease with McCarthy.445  Eisenhower, 
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too, let it be known that he was “ripping mad” at McCarthy’s attack on an 
Army colleague,446 although he refrained from attacking the senator 
directly.447  But even the hint of criticism from the White House was too 
much for McCarthy, who lambasted the president and insisted that he would 
continue exposing Communists in positions of power.  James Reston, no fan 
of McCarthy, couldn’t help but admire his performance:  to Eisenhower’s 
bland and indirect criticism, McCarthy “answered back, not with a polite 
aide-memoire, but with a television show . . . a perfect illustration of his 
mastery of mass communication techniques . . . .  As a result, the McCarthy 
image and melody lingered on the TV screens tonight, long after the 
President had gone to bed.”448  But Reston also recognized that McCarthy’s 
behavior had the potential to exacerbate the split in the Republican 
coalition,449 and he was not wrong.  Many formerly McCarthy-sympathetic 
Republicans regarded his attack on Eisenhower as a bridge too far.450 
Two figures who had never been sympathetic to McCarthy took the 
opportunity to pile on.  Less than a week after McCarthy’s attack on 
Eisenhower, Senator Ralph Flanders (R-VT) took to the Senate floor to blast 
McCarthy.  Flanders had nothing to lose—he was immensely popular in his 
home state and had already announced that he would not seek reelection in 
1958.451  Flanders insisted that McCarthy was “doing his best to shatter the 
party whose label he wears.”452  Even more noteworthy, however, was 
Flanders’s tone of folksy—and racist—mockery.  After describing the 
current state of international affairs, he asked: 
In this battle of the agelong war, what is the part played by the junior 
Senator from Wisconsin?  He dons his war paint.  He goes into his war 
dance.  He emits his war whoops.  He goes forth to battle and proudly 
returns with the scalp of a pink Army dentist.453 
The press took notice:  the Post reprinted Flanders’s entire speech beginning 
on the front page, and it also ran an article about it on the front page.454  The 
Times also discussed Flanders’s speech on the front page and described it as 
part of a coordinated move by Senate Republican leadership to rein in 
McCarthy’s attacks on the Eisenhower administration.455  That same 
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evening, Edward R. Murrow, the most respected newscaster then working,456 
devoted his entire thirty-minute episode of See It Now on CBS to a uniformly 
condemnatory report on McCarthy and his tactics.457  Much of the report 
simply consisted of edited clips of McCarthy, in speeches, press conferences, 
and committee hearings, bullying, sneering, and misleading his audiences.458  
The public reaction was intense:  CBS received record numbers of calls, 
letters, and telegrams, which ran overwhelmingly against McCarthy.459  A 
wide range of other media outlets, both broadcast and print, repeated and 
amplified Murrow’s message.460 
At roughly the same time that McCarthy was ramping up his war with both 
the Eisenhower administration and the Army, his subcommittee aide Roy 
Cohn was attempting to strong-arm the Army.  Cohn had brought his close 
friend (and, perpetual rumors had it, lover) G. David Schine on as an “unpaid 
‘chief consultant’” to the subcommittee in 1953.461  After “a series of 
questionable deferments,” Schine had been drafted and inducted into the 
Army in November 1953.462  Almost immediately, Cohn began a sustained 
campaign of pressuring Army leadership to give Schine special treatment, 
including in where he was stationed, the availability of leave, and the 
avoidance of particularly unpleasant duties.463  Cohn strongly implied that 
the subcommittee’s recent aggressive posture toward the Army was a result 
of the Army’s refusal to accommodate Schine.464 
On March 9, 1954—by coincidence, the same day as both Flanders’s floor 
speech and the Murrow broadcast—Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson 
told McCarthy that the Army had compiled a report on Cohn’s inappropriate 
pressure on Schine’s behalf and would release it publicly unless Cohn 
resigned.  McCarthy refused to ask for Cohn’s resignation, and two days 
later, the Army released the thirty-four-page report.465  A week later, the 
subcommittee met and determined that it would have to look into these 
allegations itself—as John McClellan (D-AR) told his colleagues, “it is 
before the public, and this committee cannot afford to do anything that would 
look like we are trying to hush things up.”466 
It was at this point that McCarthy lost his control over the staging of 
subcommittee hearings.  His colleagues decided that he would have to stand 
down as both chair and a member of the subcommittee but that he (as well as 
the Army) would have the right to cross-examine witnesses.467  The 
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subcommittee would be chaired by Karl Mundt (R-SD).468  To aid in making 
its case, the Army hired as outside counsel Joseph Welch, of the Hale and 
Dorr law firm.469 
Most consequential, however, was the decision to televise the Army-
McCarthy hearings, a decision on which Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson 
(D-TX)—who was not a member of the subcommittee—insisted.470  The 
hearings began on April 22, 1954, in a “cavernous” committee room that was 
designed to hold 300 but into which over 800 spectators had been 
admitted.471  In the back of the room was a custom-built, three-tiered 
platform for the “battery of television cameras,” which were supplemented 
by more scattered around the room.  Floodlights were installed to make sure 
the proceedings were legible to the cameras.472  Two of the four television 
networks—ABC and DuMont—would carry all 188 hours of the open 
hearings live; NBC and CBS would broadcast nightly summaries.473  During 
the hearings’ first week, roughly two-thirds of American households with 
television sets watched the hearings.  Perhaps most remarkably, stores 
reported an increase in TV sales during the hearings, even amid a drop in 
overall daytime shopping, as people stayed home to watch them.474  An 
estimated forty-five million Americans, or over a quarter of the total 
population of the country, watched at least part of the live telecast.475  Print 
media were no less invested, with major national newspapers devoting 
multipage spreads to the hearings every day, to such an extent that other 
national news was largely crowded out.476 
The Army entered the hearings with a costuming advantage:  all of those 
television viewers (and viewers of the photographs accompanying print 
articles) would have observed the Army’s civilian leadership “surrounded by 
generals and colonels” in uniform.477  For a nation less than a decade 
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removed from World War II and less than a year removed from the Korean 
armistice, a nation that had just elected the first military general to the 
presidency since Benjamin Harrison in 1888, the uniforms undoubtedly made 
a powerful statement. 
The contending sides also made very different scripting choices, with 
significant consequences.  McCarthy’s style was to badger, bluster, and 
interrupt as much as possible.  Before the first witness could be called, he 
had already raised a point of order,478 and he was to raise countless more in 
the coming weeks.  Indeed, one of the major biographies of McCarthy titled 
its chapter on the Army-McCarthy hearings “Point of Order”479 and noted 
that such points were “a procedural subterfuge he would employ hundreds of 
times throughout the hearings to interject commentary.”480  Welch, on the 
other hand, was far more retiring and reluctant to interject himself into the 
proceedings—but he was also incredibly well prepared, which allowed him 
to engineer dramatic plot twists.  McCarthy and Cohn claimed that any 
special treatment of Schine arose not from any pressure brought to bear by 
Cohn but rather from the Army’s improper attempts to curry favor with the 
subcommittee and get it to back off its investigation.  To this end, McCarthy-
sympathetic subcommittee counsel Ray Jenkins introduced a photograph 
(that he had received from Cohn) of Schine with a smiling Secretary of the 
Army Robert Stevens.481  Within a day, however, Welch was able to 
demonstrate that the photo was misleading.  It was originally a group picture, 
cut down to make it appear as if Stevens and Schine had been alone.482  
Welch’s revelation of the deception garnered a four-column headline in the 
next day’s Times,483 and the Post’s headline—running three lines across the 
entire front page—noted that both sides had been warned about the 
possibility of perjury charges being filed.484  As David Oshinsky has noted, 
Welch’s preparation allowed him “with enormous skill . . . to rekindle 
memories of the dishonest McCarthy”485—that is, to use the dramatic device 
of a plot twist in order to make an ethical argument about his antagonist.  In 
Time magazine’s estimation, this skill defined Welch as “easily the 
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smoothest performer . . . in the McCarthy-Army hearings . . . .  a superb 
actor.”486 
McCarthy tried to counter with the clever use of a prop.  After teasing it 
once, he pulled out of his briefcase what he claimed was a “carbon copy” of 
a letter that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had written to the Army in 1951 
containing a list of thirty-four possible subversives at Fort Monmouth.487  If 
this letter were accurate, it would indeed suggest that the Army had 
deliberately ignored Communist infiltration of the Signal Corps.  Again, 
Welch’s preparation paid off:  he immediately questioned the letter’s 
authenticity, having not come across it in the weeks he had spent going 
through the Pentagon’s files on McCarthy and Communist subversion.488  
The next day, a subcommittee aide who had been sent to talk to Hoover 
reported that the letter did not come from the FBI’s files.  The FBI had written 
a fifteen-page memo that it sent to the Army in 1951 on a similar topic 
containing some of the same language, but the actual FBI memo emphasized 
that the claims related therein were “unevaluated.”489  Welch pointedly 
pressed the subcommittee aide:  “So far as you know, this is a carbon copy 
of precisely nothing.”  The aide replied:  “So far as I know, it is, yes.”490  
McCarthy himself was then called to the stand, where he refused to answer 
Welch’s questions about where he got the “carbon copy.”491  The Post’s 
headline—“McCarthy Won’t Name Informant”492—was striking, given how 
much hay McCarthy himself had made of other witnesses’ refusals to answer 
questions before his subcommittee.  The Post also editorialized about this 
“second forgery” (after the cropped photograph) that constituted “a fraud and 
a hoax on the Senate and on the American people.”493 
At this point, recognizing that the hearings were shaping up badly for 
McCarthy, subcommittee member and McCarthy ally Everett Dirksen (R-IL) 
proposed that the remaining hearings be truncated and—crucially—not 
televised.494  Chairman Mundt, who desperately wanted to follow this course 
of action, was bound by an earlier promise not to end the hearings early if 
any of the principal parties objected.  Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens, 
with Eisenhower’s support, objected, and the hearings continued.495  In this 
context of an already wounded McCarthy, Flanders took to the Senate floor 
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again to deliver “one of the meanest attacks on a fellow member in years.”496  
This speech contained some of the same folksiness of his earlier attack, 
referring to McCarthy as “Dennis the Menace” and noting that “[o]ur busy 
Senator does get us adults into all kinds of trouble.”497  But it also contained 
more sober accusations, explicitly comparing McCarthy to Hitler498 and 
suggesting that Moscow was not displeased with the Senator’s activities:  
“One of the characteristic elements of Communist and Fascist tyranny is at 
hand, as citizens are set to spy upon each other . . . .  Were the junior Senator 
from Wisconsin in the pay of the Communists, he could not have done a 
better job for them.”499  Flanders’s speech also contained thinly veiled 
homophobic references to the rumored relationship between Cohn and 
Schine, asking why Cohn “seems to have an almost passionate anxiety to 
retain [Schine].”500  Once again, the press took note.501 
The most immediately and enduringly famous moment of the Army-
McCarthy hearings came a little over a week after Flanders’s speech.  Welch 
and Cohn, with McCarthy’s blessing, had earlier struck a side deal:  neither 
Cohn nor McCarthy would mention that an associate at Hale and Dorr named 
Fred Fisher had several years earlier belonged to the National Lawyers Guild, 
an organization deemed “subversive” by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee.  Fisher had initially been tasked to help Welch represent the 
Army, but when he volunteered his previous affiliation to Welch, he was 
asked to step away from the matter.  Fisher therefore did almost no work on 
the Army-McCarthy hearings.  In exchange for agreeing not to bring up 
Fisher’s name, Welch agreed not to ask how it was that Cohn had never been 
drafted into the armed forces.502  On June 9, while Cohn was testifying—and 
much to his dismay—McCarthy got frustrated with the questioning and broke 
the deal, interrupting the testimony to announce that Welch “has in his law 
firm a young man named Fisher whom he recommended, incidentally, to do 
work on this committee, who has been for a number of years a member of an 
organization which was named, oh, years and years ago, as the legal bulwark 
of the Communist Party.”503  Again, Welch was prepared, having scripted 
his famous response in advance.  After demanding that McCarthy stop 
speaking to an aide and pay attention to what he was saying, Welch 
continued:  “Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your 
cruelty or your recklessness.”504  He then recounted how Fisher had 
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volunteered the information of his previous Guild membership and been 
asked to step away from work on the hearings, and Welch reiterated his 
support for Fisher.  “Little did I dream you could be so reckless and so cruel 
as to do an injury to that lad.”505  When McCarthy persisted in talking about 
Fisher, Welch delivered his coup de grâce:  “Have you no sense of decency, 
sir, at long last?  Have you left no sense of decency?”506  After another brief 
back-and-forth, Welch announced that he was done questioning Cohn.507 
The hearing room erupted in applause; Chairman Mundt, who had 
previously kept a tight leash on disruptions from the gallery, made no attempt 
to silence it.508  As Robert Shogan noted, 
The impact of Welch’s rebuke was heightened by the dexterity of the TV 
camera crews.  Three separate cameras were aimed at each of the principals 
in this climactic exchange—McCarthy, Cohn, and Welch, catching them 
not only as they spoke but as they reacted to the words of the others.  As 
for McCarthy, he seemed in a state of shock.509 
The press immediately recognized this as a crucial moment.  The Times and 
the Post both splashed it across multiple columns of the front page; in the 
Times, it was accompanied by a photograph of Welch “near tears,” while the 
Post helped its readers know with whom to side by mentioning the audience 
applause in its headline.510 
It would be a mistake to describe the exchange over Fisher as a turning 
point.  It was more of a culmination or crystallization of the overall 
impression of the hearings to that point,511 an impression that called on 
memories of overspeech going back to the Tydings committee.  McCarthy’s 
net favorability rating in Gallup polls, which had stood at +21 in January 
1954, stood at -11 by June, and it would never recover.512  Two days after 
the Fisher exchange, Ralph Flanders engaged in a brilliant piece of 
overspeech.  While McCarthy was on the stand testifying, Flanders—who 
was not a member of the subcommittee—walked up and handed him a note.  
The note, which McCarthy dutifully read aloud, informed him that Flanders 
intended that afternoon to make another floor speech about McCarthy.  
Chairman Mundt, obviously baffled, asked Flanders to withdraw, but 
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Flanders had already accomplished his goal:  everyone watching the hearings 
on television and every newspaper editor planning the next day’s front page 
had advance notice of Flanders’s next move.513  That next move was to 
introduce a resolution stripping McCarthy of his committee and 
subcommittee chairmanships.514  Flanders’s resolution was featured on the 
front page of the next day’s Times and Post, both of which ran it alongside a 
photo of Flanders handing McCarthy the note.515 
The next month, after the Army-McCarthy hearings had come to a close, 
Flanders withdrew that resolution and substituted one condemning McCarthy 
for “conduct . . . unbecoming a Member of the United States Senate . . . and 
tend[ing] to bring the Senate into disrepute.”516  The galleries were packed 
for Flanders’s speech introducing the censure resolution.517  After several 
days of debate, the Senate referred the resolution to a six-person special 
committee, made up of three members of each party, all of whom were long-
standing and well-respected members of the chamber.  Republican Arthur 
Watkins of Utah would be the chair.518 
The Watkins committee hearings would perform calmness and solemnity 
as a form of rebuttal to the manner in which McCarthy himself held hearings, 
a fact not lost on observers.  As anti-McCarthyite journalist Alan Barth put 
it, the Watkins committee was “in almost every important respect the 
antithesis” of the McCarthy-led Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations.519  In marked contrast to the Army-McCarthy hearings, they 
barred television cameras from the proceedings.520  The New York Times’s 
front-page report on the first day of Watkins committee hearings noted that, 
when McCarthy’s continual raising of objections disturbed the “court-like 
calm” of the hearings, Watkins “silenced [him] as being out of order.”521 
The Watkins committee’s report was released in late September, about five 
weeks before the midterm elections in which Democrats retook control of 
both houses of Congress, a result at least partially attributable to public 
disgust with McCarthyism.522  Less than a month later, the full Senate voted 
to censure McCarthy by a lopsided 67 to 22 vote.523  The Times editorialized 
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that, by censuring McCarthy, “the Senate of the United States has done much 
to redeem itself in the eyes of the American people,” and noted that the 
Watkins committee “conducted a model inquiry.”524  Four days later, an 
angry outburst against Eisenhower would earn McCarthy his last front-page 
story until his obituary.525  He would remain in the Senate for two and a half 
years longer, “shunned by his political allies [and] ignored by the press.”526  
In May 1957, he died from alcoholism.527 
Overspeech is central to the McCarthy story at every turn.  His speeches 
on the Senate floor and his performance before the Tydings committee were 
vital to his building a national constituency.  His careful stage management 
of Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearings—including his 
understanding of the potential of television as a medium of political 
communication—made him into one of the most powerful people in the 
nation.  But overspeech was also essential to the pushback against McCarthy 
from the beginning, ranging from Millard Tydings’s use of props, to Joseph 
Welch and the Army’s uses of scripting and costuming, to Ralph Flanders’s 
combination of folksy mockery, insulting innuendo, and devious spotlight-
stealing.  Initially, by figuring the choice as being either with him or with the 
Communists, McCarthy was able to silence a lot of would-be critics.  But the 
divisiveness that initially served him so well eventually turned on him, by 
ensuring that he had a dedicated cadre of enemies eager to see him fall.  
McCarthy, who rose to prominence through overspeech, was brought low by 
the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Oversight is one of Congress’s most important functions.  It makes the 
“intelligent exercise” of all other congressional powers possible,528 but it also 
makes it possible for Congress to shape the exercise of public intelligence 
and judgment.  It is this second way of using the tools of oversight—not as a 
means for Congress to inform itself but rather as a means to communicate 
with the public—that I have referred to as overspeech.  As the case studies 
above demonstrate, overspeech, like any political tool, is no better than the 
actor wielding it.  But the purpose for which it is wielded notwithstanding, 
this Article has demonstrated both that overspeech is a common phenomenon 
and that it is an institutionally valuable one, providing Congress with 
important tools to compete with the other branches for public support and, 
therefore, for power. 
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